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ABSTRACT 
 
Determination of Risk Factors for High-Cost Cases within DRG systems of 
selected European Countries 
Mohamed, Rosminah 
 
Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) have provided a new aspect of financial 
tool to the health care systems in Europe. However, the EU countries have to 
address the challenges of cost variation within DRG to a different degree 
because only DRG systems with high levels of cost homogeinety can be 
used as prospective pricing systems.  
The first study ojective is to identify the risk factor adopted in the German G-
DRG system, the Dutch DBC system, the Swedish NordDRG system and the 
French-GHM system; secondly to compare the differences and similarities of 
the risk factors developed and chosen within each national DRG system and 
finally to analyse the dependency of the existing risk factors on the national 
health care structure. Consequences for the possibility of future cross-border 
EU DRG systems should be discussed. Systematic literature analysis is 
chosen to analyse the currently employed DRG systems and risk factors in 
four selected EU countries: Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and France. 
There are substantial differences of current European national health care 
systems and risk factors used in the DRG systems. Distinguishable 
methodologies apply for the determination of the cost weights within the 
selected countries and may contribute to the variation of the derived risk 
factors. A common European DRG system is therefore far beyond to be 
realistic within the short or medium terms. 
 
Content 
Content 
List of figures ...................................................................................................... II 
List of tables ...................................................................................................... III 
Abbreviations..................................................................................................... IV 
1 Background ................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Incentives for using DRG systems................................................................ 3 
1.1.1 DRG System and its employment ................................................. 3 
1.1.2 The Incentives............................................................................... 5 
1.2 Characteristics of DRG Systems................................................................... 7 
1.2.1 The DRG System.......................................................................... 7 
1.2.2 The DRG concept ....................................................................... 10 
1.2.3 The DRG framework and case costing ....................................... 10 
1.2.4 DRG systems and its differences................................................ 12 
1.3 Limitations of DRG Systems ....................................................................... 14 
2 Methodology............................................................................................. 16 
2.1 Study Objective........................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Selection for Analysis.................................................................................. 16 
2.2.1 The research proxy ..................................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Concept and scope of study ....................................................... 17 
2.2.3 Data resource ............................................................................. 19 
2.3 Review of literature ..................................................................................... 20 
3 Results ..................................................................................................... 25 
3.1 The German G-DRG-System...................................................................... 25 
3.1.1 Use in the Health Care System................................................... 25 
3.1.2 The System itself......................................................................... 28 
3.1.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System........................ 32 
3.2 The Dutch Diagnosis Behandeling Combinaties (DBC).............................. 34 
3.2.1 Use in the Health Care System................................................... 36 
3.2.2 The System itself......................................................................... 38 
3.2.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System........................ 42 
3.3 The Swedish use of the Nord-DRGs........................................................... 44 
3.3.1 Use in the Health Care System................................................... 45 
3.3.2 The System itself......................................................................... 45 
3.3.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System........................ 48 
3.4 The French Groupes homogènes de maladies (GHM) ............................... 50 
3.4.1 Use in the Health Care System................................................... 50 
3.4.2 The System itself......................................................................... 51 
3.4.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System........................ 52 
4 Discussion................................................................................................ 64 
4.1 National Differences in Determination of Risk Factors................................ 64 
4.2 Dependence of Risk Factors Determination on the Structure of  
National Health Care System...................................................................... 70 
4.2.1 German health care system and risk factor determination.......... 70 
4.2.2 Swedish health care and risk factor determination ..................... 71 
4.2.3 French health care and risk factor determination........................ 72 
4.2.4 Dutch health care and risk factor determination.......................... 73 
4.3 The Future Determination of Risk Factors in DRG Systems....................... 73 
5 References............................................................................................... 76 
CURRICULUM VITAE...................................................................................... 82 
I 
List of figures 
List of figures 
Fig. 1.1:  Inter-related impact of DRG incentive to the patient,  
Hospital, care health market and the national health  
care system ………………..........................................................… 5 
Fig. 1.2:  Categorization of patient classification …………………………..….9 
Fig. 2.1:  Research methodology: the systematic literature review  
approach ………………………………………………………………18 
Fig. 3.1:  The hierarchical of the German DRG ……………………………...30 
Fig. 3.2:  Episode-based registration of hospital products, DBCs  
with related  intermediate products ……………………………...   38 
Fig. 3.3:  Product costing model to calculate the intermediate  
product costs and DBCs ………………………………………… …41 
Fig. 3.4:  Swedish-NordDRG assignment process ……………………...…. 46 
Fig. 4.1:  Venn diagram simplifying the similarities and differences  
of risk factors apply in each country ………………………….…... 65 
Fig. 4.2:  Different type of reimbursement systems and rates employ  
in Germany, Sweden, France and Netherlands …………….…... 69 
 
II 
List of tables 
List of tables 
Tab/ 2.1:  The related study terms and definitions ……………………………19 
Tab. 3.1:  Example of the parameters used in Ophthalmology  
   department for adjustment activity ……………………………....…43 
Tab/ 3.2:   The summary of the health care system, prospective  
payment system and the objective of employment  
in Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and France …………………. 60 
Tab. 3.3:   The summary of the DRG system taxonomy, the cost  
calculation and the risk factor employ in Germany,  
Netherlands, Sweden and France ………………..……………….. 62 
 
III 
Abbreviations 
Abbreviations 
ADRG Adjacent DRG (Basis-DRG) 
ALOS Average length of stay 
APC Ambulatory Payment Classification 
AR-DRG Australian Refined DRG  
CC Complication and Comorbidity 
CCL Complication and Comorbidity Level 
CM Case-Mix (sum of relative weights) 
CMI Case-Mix-Index (ratio of sum of relative weights [i.e.CM] and number of cases, represents mean of relative weight) 
CPK Center for Patient Classification 
DBC Diagnosis Behandeling Combinatie 
DIMDI The German Institute for Medical Documentation and Information 
DRG Diagnosis Related Group 
EU European Union 
FP Fallpauschalen 
GDP Gross domestic product 
G-DRG German Diagnosis Related Group, Deutsches DRG-System 
GHM Groupes Homogenes de Malades 
HCFA Health Care Financing Administration 
HRG Healthcare Resource Groups 
ICD Internationale Statistische Klassifikation der Krankheiten und verwandter Gesundheitsprobleme (10. Revision) 
InEK Institut für das Entgeltsystem im Krankenhaus gGmbH („DRG-Institut“ der Selbstverwaltungspartner) 
KV Kassenärztliche Vereinigung 
LKF Leistungsorientierte Krankenanstaltenfinanzierung (output orientated hospital financing system 
LSO Long-stay outliers  
MCE Medicare Code Editor 
MDC Major Diagnostic Category (Hauptdiagnosekategorie) 
NCSP Nomesco Classification of Surgical Procedures 
NUB Neue Untersuchungs- und Behandlungsmethoden (nach § 6 Abs. 2 KHEntgG) 
OPS Operationen- und Prozedurenschlüssel (nach § 301 SGB V), procedure classification 
OR Operating Room (-Prozedur) 
PCCL Patientenbezogene klinische Komplexitätsstufe (Patient Clinical Complexity Level) 
IV 
Abbreviations 
PPS Prospective payment system 
RA Risk adjustment 
RG Relativgewicht (see also Bewertungsrelation: BR) 
SAPS Simplified Acute Physiology Score 
SHI Statutory Health Insurance 
SPRI Swedish Institute for Health Services Development 
TISS Therapeutic Intervention Scoring System 
US United States 
V 
Background 
1 Background 
Increase in health care expenditures both in the annual health budget and per 
capita can be observed in all EU countries. In order to control health care 
expenditures most EU governments introduced and use Diagnosis Related 
Group (DRG) systems. Controlling health care expenditures with the help of 
DRG-based reimbursement systems efficiency, solidarity (fairness and equity), 
high quality standards for the entire population and universal access to care can 
be maintained [16].  
Every DRG system in active use is on a stage of continuous change. The main 
reasons for changes are due to the evolution in medical treatments and 
management of health care. The two most important criteria for changes are the 
same requirements of resource intensity within given DRG and similar type of 
patients in each DRG from a clinical perspectives. DRGs are either altered, 
added or removed, usually on yearly basis. Variations in costs will always be 
present, and hospitals should expect that some patients will cost more to treat 
than the payment rate. In practice, much depends on the efficiency of the 
episode classification. None of the classifications used for the payment of acute 
inpatient episodes is entirely satisfactory. The main problem relates to a small 
but significant proportion of cases, which costs are far exceeding the payment 
rates for the classes to which they belong. Therefore most payment systems 
based on DRGs use “rules” as a cost control mechanism for unusually costly 
patients (high outliers), where additional payments are made.  
Allocation of resources is a paramount importance in health care organizations. 
An important aspect of this problem is allocating funds for very high cost 
patients. Understanding and predicting how this patient arises is a subject of 
continuing research [22]. Several articles evaluate the ability of diagnosis-based 
risk adjustment systems to predict high cost patients [22]. Risk adjustment (RA) 
systems have difficulty predicting the exact costs of these patients because they 
are rare and driven by relatively rare acute events. In DRG systems, these 
events are referred to high-cost DRGs represent patients whose defined 
1 
Background 
algorithm is above boundary point relative to patients treated for the same 
condition, who are known as high outlier cases. Patients who become high 
outliers are often reviewed to ensure that there is no system issue that is 
preventing them from leaving hospital. An episode defined to be an outlier 
because it involves use of resources which is far above the average for the 
class to which it belongs. Application of an appropriate RA model is believed 
able to achieve greater allocation and equitable funding for referral hospital. [41]  
The mainstream of RA methodologies is a valid and useful tool to measure 
quality-improvement activities, affected by the confounding and modification 
produced by the medical care over risk variables’ effect. Thus, criteria involving 
patient diagnostic, demographic, and medical characteristics are the most 
effective way to proceed. RA analysis is eventually of benefit for both, the 
hospital and the health insurance company. Whereby, the latter should receive 
a sufficient risk-adjusted payment (premium) from each consumer as it reflected 
the consumer’s predicted health expenditure. And, the former should be 
reimbursed based on patient’s health-risk adjustment charges. An appropriate 
RA must be context specific. Thus, the outcome generated model is proven 
worked well on the ground [6].  
Several approaches have been taken by those countries employing DRG-based 
payment system to alleviate the difficulties caused by the high-cost cases. 
Splitting the case type into two or more parts according to clinical attributes 
(such as diagnoses or method of treatment) and then setting different payment 
rates for each is most commonly done [46, 53]. There are countries that make 
an approach to involve measurement of attributes which could contribute to high 
cost, such as severity of illness [1, 48, 53].  Another approach is using care 
pathways [26, 41, 42, 45]. Taking advantage from the subset of reasons why 
the patient deviated can be selected as the basis for making additional 
payments, which is equivalent to high outlier payments. 
Ensuring equity of access to health services, rising quality, improving health 
outcomes, sustainable financing, improving efficiency, greater responsiveness, 
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reducing barriers between health and social care are among mission and vision 
of health care provision to the population. However, the response of these 
challenges differs as each country adopts the most appropriate approach 
anchored to its historical, political, social and cultural context. As regard to the 
health care system, EU Member States have several things in common; a 
mandatory health insurance system that possibly supported with government 
revenue, supplemented health insurance, risk bearing sickness funds, a 
guaranteed periodic consumer choice among sickness funds and a risk 
adjustment mechanism. The possibility for them to share a similar view towards 
encountering the high-cost cases present within the DRG system and apply the 
same risk factors, is currently vague and yet to rectify.  
 
1.1 Incentives for using DRG systems 
DRGs has a long-standing system of prospective payment system (PPS) due to 
their immanent potential to control health care cost, several social objectives 
such as improving overall health care quality reflected in a good health care 
delivery [39] feed into the DRG system.  
 
1.1.1 DRG System and its employment 
In broad terms, the economic goals of health systems include control over total 
cost, allocative efficiency and technical efficiency [57]. To achieve these goals, 
case mix systems are introduced and applied in several countries around the 
world as a cost containment strategy. It is used for hospital resource allocation 
planning, hospital management, and tracking care productivity and quality. 
Internationally, many countries adopted the original American model and 
modified it to meet country-specific needs. Based on the costs per weighted 
case resulted from the cost of patient’s hospitalization in a specific condition 
and usually classified according to clinical diagnoses, the allocation of hospital 
resources is finely determined. University hospitals, as referral hospitals usually 
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receive higher allocation compared to other hospitals, judgmentally based on 
the more critical cases they receive. 
Ever since, the manner of which the data collected and reimbursement rates 
calculated in hospital management systems differs substantially among the EU 
countries. Resource consumption is calculated based on average treatment 
costs in the particular group of DRGs. In order to obtain homogenous resource 
groups at the hospital level, DRG Classification System groups inpatient by 
principle diagnosis, co-morbidities, surgical procedures, discharge status age 
and sex. Usually, the cost differences within the same groups are compensated 
because the expensive cases are outweighed by those with lower-than-average 
costs. The presence of outlier cases within DRGs that incorporate with either 
very low or high costs can distort the calculation of the average costs per DRG. 
Whereby, the so-called “masking effect” will be happening due to under valued 
or over valued DRG that were not corrected accordingly [24]. This is the main 
challenge of this system, to classify treatment episode into both medically 
coherent and cost-homogenous group at the same time. Consequently, the 
average resource use for each group can be determined [36].  
The force of payment and quality performance are starting to converge. Pay for 
performance is an emerging movement in health insurance (initially in Britain 
and United States). This is the first step towards changing the hospital payment 
system to one-based combination of diagnosis and treatment. Providers under 
this arrangement are rewarded for meeting pre-established targets for delivery 
of health care services. Pay for performance cannot consist of a one-size fit all 
approach. However, there should be common agreement on the overall 
conceptual approach together with a tool box of approved techniques from 
which payers, providers and consumers can choose to build the incentives 
needed to implement pay for performance. The variation in quality of care, 
variation in health care cost services underuse and overuse, the opportunities 
for cost reduction and quality improvement can be identified [18].  
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1.1.2 The Incentives 
Many studies have examined the incentives of the DRG-based PPS on costs, 
operational matters, and on quality [11, 36, 17, 18]. It appears that the 
implementations has positively affected on patient’s health quality, in certain 
ways hospital operated, increased the insurance market competition as a whole 
through a few incentives offered within the system and improve health care 
provision system at the national level. The mutual impact caused by the 
incentives offered by the DRG system is diagrammatically showed in Figure 1.1 
below. 
 
 
National health care 
Health care market 
Hospital Patient 
Figure 1.1: Inter-related impact of DRG incentive to the patient, hospital, health 
care market and the national health care system 
 
There was evidence of decreased average length of stay (ALOS), admission 
and intensity of care, and thus health care costs. There are issues of DRG 
upcoding purposely to receive higher reimbursement. Measures are being 
developed in various countries to curb this phenomenon by creating reward 
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systems to motivate medically correct coding [54]. It may encourage more 
coding of complications (up-coding) if this leads to an upgrading in the severity 
of DRG, and therefore increased reimbursement. It may encourage more 
intensive treatment of patients if such treatment leads to an upgrading in the 
severity of DRG, and therefore increased reimbursement (but only if the 
increase in reimbursement exceeds the increased costs of treatment). 
Within a treatment group, the payment mechanism gives a strong incentive to 
minimize costs, or to shift the costs of treatment onto other parties (such as the 
user or a social care agency). On their own, pure case payments offer no 
incentive to maintain quality of care (indeed there may be strong incentives for 
quality skimping). It encourages treatment of patients whose expected costs are 
lower than the associated reimbursement. This might be beneficial (if those 
patients will benefit from treatment) or adverse (if the benefits are questionable). 
Broad diagnosis groups give powerful incentives to efficiency, and minimize the 
scope for data manipulation. However, they also give strong incentives for 
cream-skimming lower cost patients and to skimp on some aspects of quality. 
Other incentive is DRGs create a financial incentive for hospital to avoid high-
dependency patients, whose expected costs are higher than the associated 
reimbursement.  
The financing of health care services under DRG assignment is a prospective 
manner. Compared to retrospective payment system (hospitals were 
reimbursed in full for costs expended in service provision), the PPS introduced 
pre-determined reimbursement rates for service packages determined based on 
DRGs.  The PPS can foresee the health care services reimbursement is a 
relative and resource driven system. Hospitals within EU countries are using 
DRGs as instrument for hospital reimbursement and receive fixed payment 
(reimbursement) from sickness fund based on DRGs calculation. Sickness 
funds have a budgeting system in which they negotiate the quality, quantity and, 
to some extent, price of services with providers. This gives the funds some 
flexibility and incentives to purchase care as effectively as possible, and to 
encourage market competition. Additional provisions were made of quality 
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assurance to provide medical stability upon discharge such that hospitals were 
not "dumping" the patients to maximize the reimbursement system.  These 
internal mechanics of quality assurance were monitored by state and federal 
guidelines 
 
1.2 Characteristics of DRG Systems 
1.2.1 The DRG System 
The DRG system is used to describe the patient case-mix in hospital care. In 
the late 1970s Professor Robert Fetter of Yale University developed the concept 
of DRG to simplify the complexity of patient specific diagnoses, by grouping 
similar diagnostic categories into clinically meaningful diagnostic clusters, where 
resource use was also similar. There are three rules for a competent DRG 
system: each DRG must be clinically meaningful in a way that the diagnostic 
clusters must be acceptable by clinicians; each DRG must be resource 
homogeneous in such a way that the type of resources used and their amount, 
should on average be the same for each episode of care within the DRGs, and 
lastly the specific diagnostic episodes should "map" to that DRG alone, and not 
to multiple possible DRGs. The basic idea was to describe hospital activity by 
focusing on the total hospital spell as the final product, measured as discharges 
defined according to the patient‘s diagnosis (described according to the 
International Classification of Diseases, or ICD-codes), and reflecting resources 
used. 
The DRG system was first applied in the United States (US) in 1983 as basis for 
the PPS introduced in Medicare (is often termed as HCFA-DRG system, after 
the Health Care Financing Administration who was responsible for its 
implementation). Since then, a number of countries have implemented DRG 
systems in hospital care (Figure 1.2). Currently, DRG systems capture mainly 
inpatient care activities although some countries have developed DRGs also for 
outpatient care (e.g. day surgery). Yale University developed DRGs in the early 
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1970s, mainly to describe all types of patient care in an acute care hospital in 
response to the rising costs of health care. Initially, the focus was on the 
identification and explanation of the differences in performance and in the 
treatment quality. However, soon they recognized the potential for cost 
containment. In 1983, the system initially encompassed the Medicare program 
of the US as part of a PPS for hospital spending, involved newborn, paediatric, 
and general adult populations.  
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1988 
1986 
1983 
1977 
1995 
1993 
1997 
1996 
2003 
2002 
1991 
Yale DRG 
HCFA DRG 
GHM1  
GHM 
France 
AP-DRG 
APR-DRG 
AN-DRG 
AR-DRG 
G-DRG 
Germany 
Nord-DRG 
1999 
Swedish-
NordDRG 
PMSI 
Hungary 
Italy 
Denmark 
HRG 
England 
Spain 
Classification adopted with or without minor modification 
Classification adopted with minor modification 
Figure 1.2: Categorization of patient classification 
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1.2.2 The DRG concept 
Conceptually, the DRG system groups patients by means of specially designed 
software into a certain number of categories based on their main diagnosis, 
clinical procedure codes, gender, age, and the presence of complications and 
complexities, which those are also served as screening criteria. The grouping 
procedure starts out by categorising patients in Major Diagnostic Categories 
(MDCs) according to their main diagnosis. Subsequently, separation is made 
between medical and surgical cases. The resulting DRGs are assumed to be 
categorised in a way so that each group is homogenous with respect to clinical 
and economic resource requirements.  
Hospitals are paid a predetermined amount of money for treating patients from 
a given DRG, regardless of the actual cost of care provided. The German DRG 
variant seeks to classify hospital patients into over 1.000 groups or categories, 
using the diagnoses and procedures assigned to patients. Consequently, each 
DRG describes the service provided by the hospital by grouping together 
patient episodes (that are clinically similar) and use similar levels of resources.  
 
1.2.3 The DRG framework and case costing 
The framework of DRGs is hierarchical and MDCs represent the body systems 
built with a specific medical specialty. In Germany, the DRG system consists of 
23 MDCs. The next level in the hierarchy divides each MDC into surgical, 
medical  and “other” partition. The third level then assigns surgical patients into 
a DRG based on diagnosis and procedures performed and medical patients into 
a DRG based on the principal diagnosis and secondary diagnosis for which the 
patient was admitted.   
The underlying coding system for diagnosis in use is the ICD-classification. 
Responsible for DRG assignment are the principal diagnosis, secondary 
diagnosis, operating room procedures, or a diagnosis-procedure combination. 
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In some circumstances patient’s age, gender, type of discharge or length of stay 
may also influence the DRG grouping.  
The DRG method assigns a numeric value to an acute care inpatient hospital 
episode of care, which serves as a relative weighting factor intended to 
represent the resource intensity of the clinical group in hospital care that is 
classified into the specific DRG. The DRG system allows only one DRG 
assignment per patient episode, so payment includes all services that occur 
between hospital admission and discharge. Grouping patients in this manner 
allows hospitals to evaluate and manage costs by DRG or groups of DRGs. 
Hospitals can also benchmark by groups for quality and resource measurement. 
Although hospitals assign cases to DRGs for internal use, the DRG used for 
payment is calculated as part of the claims processing. There are a series of 
steps in calculating the total DRG payment. 
Unlike the traditional per diem costs that daily rates are established for specific 
hospital departments and represent the average cost of hospitalization in 
specific departments, costs per weighted case capture the cost of 
hospitalization of a patient in a specific condition and are usually classified 
according to clinical diagnoses.  
Case mix complexity refers to an interrelated but distinct set of patient attributes 
to, such as severity of illness, risk of mortality, prognosis, treatment difficulty, 
need for intervention and resource intensity. Severity of illness describes the 
extent of the physiologic decompensation or organ system loss of function. The 
risk of mortality indicates the patient’s likelihood of dying. The systems are 
differentiated by trajectory of development, clinical logic, severity classification 
structure, and level of complexity. 
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1.2.4 DRG systems and its differences 
Over time DRG technology has evolved rapidly, to support the need for quality 
health care projects and facilitate the implementation and use of critical 
pathways, to include changes in health care delivery and advances in medicine. 
It also serves hospital needs for data management, reimbursement and 
comparability, benchmarking, and other types of research. Hence, few improved 
DRG versions such as AP-DRG, AR-DRG, APS-DRG and more, were 
developed within US Medicare system with distinguished taxonomy to evaluate 
acute care in hospitals and consider the factors that affect the cost of delivering 
inpatient health services. As a reimbursement system the DRG assignment 
determines the payment level the hospital will receive. 
DRG variants currently apply in EU countries have diverged over the past two 
decades. The rapid changes and refinement done on the system resulted to the 
differences in the medical preferences on DRGs and in their cost accounting 
methodology in use. Therefore, considerable differences in the used DRG 
systems exist and make it difficult to achieve a common market in health care 
within the EU. Some European countries have developed own variants of DRG 
systems including the Scandinavian countries (Nord-DRG), France (Groupes 
Homognes de Malades, GHM), Germany (G-DRG), Netherlands (Diagnosis 
Behandeling Combinatie, DBC), Austria (Leistungsorientierte Krankenanstalten-
finanzierung, LKF) and the United Kingdom (Healthcare Resource Groups, 
HRG). And many have been adopted by other countries, mostly as a basis of 
their hospital reimbursement system.  
Australian Refined (AR-DRG) and American Health Care Financing 
Administration (HCFA) DRG systems are widely adopted as a basis of newly 
develop DRG by many countries. Obviously significant criteria within the system 
make it distinguishable. Upon many reason that make the AR-DRG system 
different, is the adjacent DRG comprises DRGs with different levels of resource 
consumption and are split on the basis of Patient Clinical Complexity Level 
(PCCL), age, malignancy, same day status, mental health status and mode of 
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separation. The Australian Case mix system uses the Complexity and 
Comorbidity level (CCL) to estimate the utilization of resources for treating 
complexities and complications. This level does not only depend on the severity 
of the complication, but it is also related to the discharge status and the 
adjacent DRG-group. While the CCL estimates the utilization of resources for 
each complication, the PCCL estimates the utilization of resources for all the 
complications and comorbidities of a patient. The PCCL is defined as “a 
measure of the cumulative effect of a patient's CCs and is calculated via a 
complex algorithm. AR-DRG system has been adopted by Germany as a basis 
for German DRG (G-DRG) system. 
While the Australian system takes into account the cumulative effect of a 
patient's CCs, the HCFA considers only if there is a complication or not and 
does not categorize them in different levels. Patients in the US system are 
assigned to one of the 25 MDCs, based on their primary diagnosis. To express 
the differences in the consumption of hospital resources between surgical 
patients and patients with medicinal treatment, a subdivision is made. Surgical 
patients are classified according to the surgical procedure, while medicinal 
patients are classified according to their main diagnosis. The final assignment of 
a patient to a DRG in the US depends on factors such as the age of the patient, 
their discharge status and the occurrences of CCs. Among countries adopted 
HCFA DRG system is France GHM and NordDRG systems. 
The Netherlands stands alone in its development of the DBC case mix system 
which are defined as the whole set of activities and interventions associated 
with a treatment received in hospitals, outpatient care and/or day care. DBC 
system is very complex and different in many ways. Among the differences 
presented by the DBC hospital reimbursement system is, the system is activity-
based description instead of patient classification (which is the case with 
DRGs). The DBC relies on an episode-based registration within hospital.  Detail 
of the system is discussed in Section 4.2.2 below. 
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NordDRG assignment process is originally developed from the HCFA DRG 
system. But, somehow it contrast where in NordDRG the decision process is 
combined to one table, DRGLOGIC. In this table all decision nodes are 
represented as variables. Currently 16 variables are actively used. Each non-
empty cell is a rule that is tested in the decision process. The process is also 
described as a traditional graphical decision tree. The content of the decision 
nodes is derived mainly from the other tables in the NordDRG system. The 
complexity of the table is a reflection of the detailed nature of the original 
assignment rules. In contrast to the DRGs Definitions Manual endorsed by 
HCFA, the DRGLOGIC table describes the whole grouping process including 
the essential rules originally contained in the Medicare Code Editor (MCE). The 
rows in the table follow the hierarchy of the original assignment rules. 
Therefore, when allocating patient cases, each row has to be checked in 
ascending order until a match is found. The system has been used to group 
Finnish and Swedish outpatient observations with cost data. 
 
1.3 Limitations of DRG Systems 
Although DRGs have been widely used, the introduction of a DRG-system has 
always been beset with some criticism. One of the major problems is that the 
DRG-system may introduce sort of financial selection if it is applied as a basis 
for a financing system. Connected with this concern, there may be doubts 
regarding the medical and economical homogeneity of a DRG classification. 
The implication is possibly for several hospitals will have some DRG in which 
their patients are always more severely ill than in other hospitals. Another 
implication might be that a patient could receive poorer quality of care to reduce 
costs or that costs might be shifted to outpatient institutions.  
Further point of criticism is that the DRG system stands or falls by the reliability 
and validity of the correct coding of diagnosis and procedures. The argument is, 
it might be tempting to place patients unjustly in expensive DRGs, the so-called 
DRG creep [41]. DRGs may be having a problem in price setting, which can 
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require a significant high charge claims data if the base is determined before 
utilization has been aggregately managed. 
There were evidence of decreased ALOS, admission and intensity of care, and 
thus health care costs. However the quality of care is tend to diminish as the 
patient need for readmission due to fast discharged and poor quality of care. 
The DRG system also discourages treatment of patients whose expected costs 
are higher than the associated reimbursement (so-called “dumping” of high-
dependency patients). Thus, threatening equity in access to health system. 
With the German DRG introduction the hospital prices within a federal state 
were adapted within the scope of a several years' adaptation period 
(convergence period). The adaptation of the DRG lump sum payment system to 
the complexity of the provided services was relatively successful. However, not 
yet adequately represented within the G-DRG system are cases with extreme 
costs. The problem is that the medical complexity and the associated costs of 
those cases has yet identified appropriately, i.e. patients who need several 
major interventions or are treated for longer periods on the intensive care unit 
during their stay in hospital.  
Although most health care provision under hospital inpatient care has assigned 
DRG reimbursement payment system, there are however, certain types of 
specialty hospitals and units were excluded from PPS because the PPS 
diagnosis related groups do not accurately account for the resource costs for 
the types of patients treated in those facilities. Facilities originally excluded from 
PPS included rehabilitation, psychiatric, children's, cancer, and long term care 
hospitals, rehabilitation and psychiatric hospital distinct part units. 
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2 Methodology 
2.1 Study Objective 
To identify the risk factor adopted in German DRG system, Netherlands DBC 
system, Swedish-NordDRG system and France GHM system. The different and 
similarity of the risk factors selected from each country is comparatively 
reviewed for further objective to observe the reliability between risk factor 
determination with its dependency on the national health care structure in each 
respective country. Finally, an appropriate strategy of risk factor determination 
for European DRG systems is proposed. 
 
2.2 Selection for Analysis 
2.2.1 The research proxy 
Four EU countries were randomly selected, generally based on their health care 
delivery system and the cost accounting system in use. These countries 
become a proxy for other EU Member States that possesses similar 
characteristics. The countries are Germany, Sweden, France and Netherlands. 
Sweden, amongst Scandinavian countries, presents a decentralized system of 
health care funding and employing the NordDRG system as hospital 
reimbursement system. Whereby Germany and the Netherlands provide 
examples of social health insurance system combined with private health 
insurance for high-income earners and self-employed persons. G-DRG and 
DBC are currently implemented in Germany and Netherlands, respectively. 
France, is comfortable with their GHM (Groupes Homogènes de Maladise) 
hospital reimbursement system illustrating a more centralized model of social 
health insurance, offering universal health coverage, a mixture of public private 
non-profit and for-profit providers.  
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2.2.2 Concept and scope of study 
The study conceptual is based on systematic review of the literature, which 
generally compile information and further investigate significant risk factors 
foiled around DRG system in each proxy country. And, the significance of its 
presence within the respective national health care system will be discussed. 
This top-down approach will generate a general conclusion, to serve as 
fundamental information for an adequate and reliable future risk factor in risk-
adjusting the high-cost variance within the DRG system.  
The scope of study involves a cross-national review on the structure of the 
health care and financing system. Extensive review on DRG systems in each 
respective country will lead to an identification of the risk factors in use. 
Investigation encompassed the general principle of DRG cost accounting will be 
done to reveal the variation of the risk factors with respect to the DRG system 
currently employed in each proxy country. The integration of knowledge gained 
from the above and the dependency of each country’s national health care 
structure with respect to the determined risk factor will lead to a discussion on 
the issues. And further, stimulate research objective for conclusion and 
proposal to be withdrawn. A complete methodological flow is illustrated in 
Figure 2.1. 
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Investigate the 
influence of the 
national health 
care structure on 
selected risk factor 
determinations
Systematic review of DRG system currently implemented among EU 
i
Four selected EU countries based on their health care 
delivery system and the DRG system in use
Sweden 
Germany 
Netherland
France 
Provides examples of social health insurance 
system combine with private health insurance for 
high-income earners or self-employed persons 
Illustrates more centralized model of social health 
insurance, offering universal health coverage, a 
mixture of public private non-profit and for-profit 
providers  
Justification of 
the risk factor 
variation among 
countries 
Discuss on the focus-issue to stimulate 
research objective for conclusion to be 
withdrawn 
Health care system  Financing system  DRG system  
Risk factor 
Represents decentralized health care system among 
Scandinavian countries that implement NordDRG 
system as hospital reimbursement system 
Figure 2.1: Research methodology: the systematic literature review approach 
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2.2.3 Data resource 
The DRG System Classification Manual and Handbook from each proxy country 
are the main sources for the respective country’s DRG system input data and 
information. Various internet data sources and academic scientific research 
searches with real-world policy experience will certainly advantageous for high-
cost DRGs variation related information and other factor contribute to the 
current issues were as well reviewed. 
Definition of terms related to current study is tabulated below. 
Term Definition 
Risk factor 
A risk factor is a variable associated with high DRG 
costs and create high-costs variance within DRG 
assignment.  
Risk adjustment 
Mechanism to compensate for differences among 
patients that may affect their health care outcomes. 
It is a way to level the unfairness in hospital 
reimbursement by statically accounting for illness, 
demographic and other factors that patients bring 
into a healthcare encounter. 
Outlier 
An outlier is a case with costs which are significantly 
different from the average for the payment class to 
which it belongs. 
High-cost cases 
Refer to cases in which algorithm is above boundary 
point relative to the patient treated for the same 
condition per episodes of care 
High-cost variance High cost difference resulted from high-costs DRGs within DRG system  
Table 2.1: The related study terms and definitions  
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2.3 Review of literature 
Worldwide, in the hospital sector, a dramatically increase of costs is observed. 
Therefore governments try by several means to gain control of the situation. 
The main goal is to control costs. There are several components that contribute 
to the rising costs in the health care delivery systems. Demographic changes, 
costly medical innovation recently boost in the health care market and demand 
for higher quality care expected to be seen in health care market that leads to 
an increase of cost treatment [2].  
High utilization of health care services by high-cost patients such as patients 
with chronic kidney disease [15], patients with thrombosis [34] and neoplasm of 
the head and neck [38] markedly demand for increasing health care resources 
to be considered. In year 2004, diseases of circulatory system is reported 
attributed the highest cost of illness (€ 35,270 million) in Germany that involved 
both gender male and female [18]. Yung et al found that elderly adult patients 
(higher than 65 years old) predicted higher costs (compared to the young one) 
because they normally have chronic illnesses treated with drugs and therefore 
incurred more costs on them. The extremely high cost of ICU care documented 
that many patients admitted to ICU died regardless of the quality of care they 
received [25]. This is appropriately determined that the high proportion of total 
expenditure occurs at the end of life [12], where patients usually diagnosed with 
multiple complications and yet, unwell differentiated by the DRG classification. 
In this circumstance, majority of instances payers did not compensate 
adequately for severity, and higher values for the severity variables therefore 
resulted in financial losses for the hospital.  
Experience from Australia and other countries indicate that a fair reimbursement 
for intensive care based on the existing DRG systems is not realistic [34, 6, 7]. 
Hospitals with a high proportion of intensive care are systematically 
underfunded, because they are the sicker and more expensive patients within 
one DRG [34]. Onnen Moerer in his study on the cost of intensive care units 
(ICU) concluded, that the mean total costs per day were €791 ± 305 (primary 
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care hospitals, €685 ± 234; general care hospitals, €672 ± 199; focused care 
hospitals, €816 ± 363; maximal care hospitals, €923 ± 306), with the highest 
cost in severe septic patients (€1,090 ± 422). Specialized and maximal care 
hospitals treat a higher proportion of the more severely ill and highly expensive 
patients; similar to the new G-DRG-based reimbursement system in German 
hospitals carry risk that intensive care will not be adequately reimbursed [25]. 
A fair hospital payment is greatly expected from this prospective reimbursement 
scheme. However, fairness hospital payment is apparently not always achieved. 
This is due to the discrepancies along the spectrum of health care treatment 
and services. The complexity even, can be seen across the same underlying 
disease diagnoses [20, 18, 56] averaging principle inherent in DRG case 
weights has resulted in some high-intensity DRG weights being too low for a 
teaching hospital that is a major referral service [2]. It is acknowledgeable, there 
are groups of illnesses that remain cannot be funded entirely on a flat rate fee 
system. Patient population at different settings may differ in terms of diagnoses, 
severity, and social support available. Treatment resources and protocols also 
may differ, and there can be similarities and differences in characteristics of 
patients treated, especially when the health provision come upon the high-cost 
DRGs that usually attach with them multiple stages of treatments and 
complexities. As a result, high-pay patients exist among patients diagnosed 
classify under the same DRGs. It is therefore, reflection of an imprecise cost 
calculation present in the system. According to Joost Z et al, based on the 
regression analysis, the larger budget hospitals have more chance to be 
underpaid as compared to smaller budget hospitals. This means that the former 
hospital receives more high-cost patients (than the latter hospital), which is 
associated to high-costs DRGs. Therefore, as regard to the public policy, Joost 
et al concluded that the new adopted DRG system must have a relation to the 
previous system in use. This can be done by introducing a recalculation on the 
case mix revenues, related to the former hospital budgets, as the scenario in 
Netherlands health care system. The over-funding patients usually contribute to 
a negative economic risk to the hospital as this high outlier cases are eventually 
distributed unevenly within hospitals. Indeed, it is crucial when it comes into 
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spending with scarce resources, particularly for inpatient care sector. Payment 
for complex cases is still too low, whereas cases with low severity are paid too 
high. This is disadvantage to university hospital and other large hospital [7] 
because the hospital received progressively less reimbursement relative to the 
costs over time due to the averaging principle inherent in the use of AR-DRG 
cost weights and the funding policy that all centers should be paid the same for 
the same AR-DRG episode [6, 7]. From the perspective of the large teaching 
hospital the pursuit of equity in addition to efficiency would involve the principle 
of a fair price that would cover the cost of the efficient provider plus allow 
‘normal profit’.  
Joost et al in their studies in Netherlands on the DBC system found that 
differences in costs of intermediate products attributed to administration of costs 
within the general budget and cost centre structure, purchase and procurement 
agreements, surgical implant used, organisational and location structures. 
Economically, this kind of case will compromise with the hospital reimbursement 
funding system; if fewer amounts reimbursed, will impose financial burden to 
the hospital and contribute to a negative impact to the overall hospital quality of 
care due to the scarce resources.  Or the hospital might go for “cream-
skimming” as an option to avoid the financial burden. Hospitals or health care 
professionals who deal with high-cost cases usually shoulder the burden of the 
costs, which has historically exceeded reimbursement (total cost per patient per 
episode of care higher than the payment received) [15]. The literature thus 
suggests that DRGs can predict part of the variances in hospital costs, and may 
therefore be suitable as an instrument for output-pricing. Once again, in 
particular, the university hospital that usually incurred by the burden of teaching 
interns and residents, ordering extra tests and procedures for teaching 
purposes, and treatment of more serious cases [56]. 
In the health care reform that involves the change of the way hospitals are 
financed, case mix system is among the options selected to cover the hospital 
budgets. However, even though the average costs of the case mix can be 
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reimbursed, some hospitals may still face substantial financial and therefore, 
social risk.  
Elements considered as risk factors vary across countries because the 
selection is relied on cost variance in the hospital cost data distribution and the 
cost weights of DRGs. Apparently, the outcome of these calculations vary and 
are influenced by a few factors such as differences in the definition of data 
samples, differences in the use of trimming methods to detect outlier cases and 
differences in the methods for calculating individual cost-weights [36]. There is 
also variation related to hospital ownership, implying that cost-weights may 
depend on the financing structure of the healthcare system as a whole. Finally, 
there is a variation in the type of cost components included in the cost base 
used to derive national cost-weights. Typically, LOS is used to determine the 
trim point due to it is easily manipulated as a basis for trimming. The long-stay 
outliers occur more frequently than short-stay outliers, implying that the average 
cost per DRG tends to exceed the median or typical case [35]. 
Magali P et al in their study highlighted that cost outliers are not always LOS or 
charges outliers. The proportion costs of costs outliers compared to the total 
costs of the sample was higher than the same proportion of the costs of LOS 
and charges. The use of LOS as an approximation of costs is thus only a 
stopgap. He suggested the use of diagnosis costs as an algorithm for trimming 
is necessary to envisage the progressive creation of a representative sample of 
hospitals, calculating the cost of the diagnoses they treat for both trimming and 
cost-weight estimation purposes. Apparently, this finding is supported by 
Antioch et al. 
Antioch et al suggested using the diagnostic cost group or hierarchical condition 
category (DCG/HCC) classification system, involving patient relative risk scores 
to risk adjust the AR-DRGs, and better control for within-DRG severity. An 
alternative possibility would be to reimburse hospitals for the expected cost of 
individuals for a period of time (such as a year), rather than pay for an inpatient 
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episode as the unit of payment. This might be appropriate for patients requiring 
chronic care.  
Comparing hospital performance that employ DRG payment system is going to 
be great advantage for improvement. However there is obstacle to achieve the 
right outcome. David M et al in their study of comparing the performance of two 
different hospitals by using indirect standardization of RA with data available 
from patient report card of fourteen Massachusetts hospitals concluded that this 
method of analyzing hospital performance is well justified for its specific case 
mix relative to the expected performance of an average provider for the same 
case mix. However, because of substantial differences in the distribution of risk 
factors, it may often be inappropriate to directly compare two hospitals using the 
results available in most public repost card.  
The review on activity-based funding system by Gustaf et al mentioned that the 
activity-based financing shows that the health care becomes more 
bureaucratized due to costs escalation that apparently infringe the medical 
professional autonomy in providing care. However, the RA done on this 
financing system would bring the impact that could be explained by the political 
and functional pressure to change, in addition to its desired effects that brought 
with it undesirable economic impact.  
To wrap-up this review, an argument for case mix payment to be acceptable, 
the average price and cost weights must be set at an appropriate standard. 
Other wise, inappropriate under-funding in the face of cost effective service 
provision can reduce distributional justice. If case mix policy is to maintain 
credibility, the funding arrangement must respond to changes in the cost 
structure of hospitals and meets increases in demand [2, 21].  
It is highly important to know the country’s DRG system and it is worthwhile to 
study the nature of the health institution (the health care and financing system) 
as it is a major element to understand why and how the DRGs have been 
implemented. Therefore, this study will begin by briefly looking at the facts of 
each DRG system for the selected countries’ for better understanding.  
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3 Results  
3.1 The German G-DRG-System 
The German health care system is based on the principle of solidarity by self 
administration between hospitals and insurance companies (statutory health 
insurance, SHI).  
German hospitals are financed on a dual basis which means that the health 
insurance schemes finance only the costs for the treatments, while the capital 
costs (e.g., investments in building, maintenance, major diagnostic equipment) 
must be financed by the bearer/government. The federal states support the 
hospitals by financing these investment costs. 
The medical costs are covered by the health insurance. This comprises all costs 
for medically necessary diagnostics and therapy. The statutory health insurance 
(approximately. 200 SHI-funds) covers 90% of the populations. Total share for 
health care expenditure from the country’s GDP in year 2006 was 245,003 
million Euros (10.7%) [56]. 
 
3.1.1 Use in the Health Care System 
Germany, like other industrialized countries in European region, has adopted a 
specific approach to the provision of health care services to the public. A single-
tiered health care system being applied in Germany has shown the efficacy that 
relies upon the macro-regulation (macroeconomic health policy) by the 
Concerted Action in Health Care. This is a private consortium of insurers, 
providers and sickness funds representatives that operate in coordination with 
the government. The consortium serves as a national forum to determine the 
target used in fee or budget negotiations. In this respect Government has a 
limited involvement.The government adopts the role in regulation, describes 
compulsory health insurance and requires cross-subsidization. 
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Hospitals in Germany can be public, private or non-profit (mostly confessional). 
The physicians are either “ambulatory care” physicians or “hospital-based” 
specialist physicians.  
Ambulatory care physicians may be general or specialist physicians. Most of 
them are organized in the so called Kassenärztliche Vereinigung, KV which 
entitles them to treat sickness fund patients. Patients are usually not restricted 
in the frequency or nature of their access to health care and they are free to 
select their ambulatory care physician and the hospital for health care services.  
Health care costs are financed by insurance premiums, related contribution of 
employers and employees. Hospitals are financed on a dual basis: investments 
are planned by the governments of the 16 Länder (states), while sickness funds 
finance ongoing expenditures and maintenance costs. The risk-compensation 
scheme among sickness funds aims to level out differences in the age, sex and 
health status structure of those insured through the different schemes. This 
system has been complemented by the high-risk pool since 2001 and by 
incentives for disease-management programmes for the chronically ill since 
2003 [57]. 
The German health care expenditure steeply rose every year [39]. Thus, 
encourage the policy maker to find an option to seduce the health care market 
for a better and financially fair for the population. As a result, a PPS was 
introduced for classifying hospital activity and be the base for the national 
hospital reimbursement system known as German Diagnosis Related Groupers 
(G-DRGs) System. 
A defined and fundamental feature of G-DRG system for case-based 
reimbursement of inpatient services and curative care day cases was enacted 
under the reformed Hospital Financing Act, January 2000. And, it officially came 
into effect by the German legislation for inpatient health care sector on January 
1, 2004, where the conversion of a flat-free model dominated the discussion 
between health care service providers and the health insurance companies. To 
ensure accurate and detailed updated informations reach to the provision of the 
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Hospital Financing Act, a self-governing body presented by the Federal 
Association of Sickness Funds, the Association of Private Health Insurance and 
the German Hospital Federation are mandated for this task and also ensure the 
continuity of G-DRG development.  
Objectives of adopting DRG hospital reimbursement system in Germany are to 
have more transparency and fairer remuneration in hospital financing and to 
create incentives for economical and performance delivery by the system. It is 
also hoping to raise efficiency in the utilisation of resources in the hospitals, 
consequently promoting for hospitals efficiency as well as reduction of 
uneconomical capacities. In Germany, DRG system stands to form a basis for 
financing, budgeting and billing, as well as to assist in the development of 
strategies to regulate the access to care and equal treatment. Insofar, Germany 
is convenient with the adopted legislation as the G-DRG system, principally 
apply to all hospitals and the services are equally distributed to all patients 
regardless in which type of insurance coverage they are into or are self-paying 
patients.  
G-DRG classification describes the activity of health care facilities, and 
principally applies to all hospitals and clinical departments with exception of 
institutions or facilities providing services in psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine 
or psychotherapy. Outpatient care is not covered by this system. Ambulatory 
care is, however, widely covered through a fee-for-service system that fixed fee 
per visit for outpatient follow-up, per procedure and for same day surgery. 
Hospital day case admissions and rehabilitation sessions were included in the 
inpatient care.  
The G-DRGs divide hospital activities into 23 MDCs that relate to certain health 
areas such as disease and disorder of the nervous system, disease and 
disorder of the eye and so on. More than 1.100 DRG codes were prescribed 
with a specific economic value (cost weight). This patient classification  system 
selectively assigns treatment cases to clinically define groups that are 
distinguished by comparable treatment cost.  
27 
Results 
After the voluntary introduction of DRG based funding in the year 2003 the G-
DRG system (German Diagnosis Related Groups) has been in effect for funding 
services of German acute care hospitals since January 2004. A budget-neutral 
period in 2003 and 2004 has been followed by a four-year period of 
convergence starting from 2005 to 2009. In this period of convergence the 
hospital-individual budget were adjusted to a uniformly hospital-independent fee 
for service (DRG) system.  
 
3.1.2 The System itself 
An updated ICD-10-AM-based Australian AR-DRG version 4.1 formed the basis 
for the G-DRG-Version 1.0 justified by the reason that AR-DRG was of the most 
developed generation which represents complications and co morbidities and 
was associated with low royalties. A comprehensive adjustment of the G-DRG 
patient classification based on local need and condition unambiguously assigns 
treatment cases into clinically defined groups that are distinguished by 
comparable treatment costs. There are two major elements of reimbursement 
namely, Zusatzentgelte and DRG, which are developed in this payment system. 
Zusatzentgelte are co-payments, described in a catalogue of reimbursements 
for special procedures. Zusatzentgelte are paid in addition to lump sum 
payment (DRG). The patient episodes are selectively assigned by procedure 
that is based on grouping algorithms. Criteria obtain from the inpatient hospital 
discharge data set such as diagnoses, procedure, clinical severity, co-morbidity, 
age and other algorithms are favorable to make the DRG assignment more 
unambiguously presented. The ICD-10-GM diagnoses and the German 
OPS301 procedure codes were respectively used for the diagnoses and 
procedure classifications.  
There are two bodies which are responsible for maintaining and updating the 
coding system with different capacity; The German Institute for Medical 
Documentation and Information (DIMDI) is officially responsible on documenting 
and updating ICD-10-GM and OPS. Whereby, Institute for Hospital 
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Reimbursement (InEK) is responsible for annually calculating the cost weights 
as part of the cost components in the hospital reimbursement system. Since 
2009 the prices for all principles that are based on case mix are negotiated at 
the state (Bundesländer) level. InEK is responsible for annually calculating the 
cost weight. The InEK enquires cooperation from hospitals in Germany to 
forward their hospital-related structural data and case-related claims data on 
yearly basis (through the Data Collecting Center, which then hands the data to 
InEK), as the cost and claim data collected from the German hospitals are 
deemed for the institute to measure resource consumption. InEK has essentially 
kept the quality and the completeness of this German case fee system by 
paying attention to the accuracy and to the scope of the data calculation 
through two steps of plausibility checking at the Data Collecting Center and 
InEK itself prior determining the cost weights and trim points [51].  
Further additional fees are used in the German DRG system, such as 
surcharges and deductions for outliers (length of stay not cost-outliers). The 
calculation of the supplementary fees is done by the InEK.  
The basis classification and assignment of DRGs in the G-DRG system oriented 
on the sequence of DRGs hierarchically, within the MDCs partitions. Figure 3.1 
illustrated the grouping process of G-DRG system, where data compilation in 
the “grouper” software will be assigned for a correct MDC to further determine 
the major diagnosis. Patients datasets will pass through the MDC categories 
prior to the selection of procedures at the MDC partitions.  The determined 
procedure will then need to go through selection for adjacent DRGs; ADRGs). 
ADRGs consist of one or more DRGs, which basically consists of the same lists 
of diagnoses. But they differ in their consumption of resources and are based 
on different factors such as Patient clinical complexity level, secondary 
diagnoses, procedures, type of discharge, and/or age. As a result, a single DRG 
for each patient episode is generated unambiguously.  
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Major diagnosis 
No procedure or no 
essential procedure for 
the respective MDC 
Significant differences in 
the resource consumption 
No significant 
differences in the 
resource consumption 
At least one surgical 
procedure 
Major diagnosis 
Co-morbidity, medical 
procedure, age, clinical 
severity, complication, cause 
of hospital discharge 
Error DRG 
Pre-MDC 
Grouper 
MDC 1 MDC 2 MDC 3 MDC 23 ……… 
Surgical DRGs Other DRGs Medical DRGs 
Adjacent DRGs 
Unsplitted DRGs 
Splitted DRGs 
Implausibility of major diagnosis, medical 
procedure, demographic characteristic etc 
Transplantation, 
ventilation, HIV etc 
Figure 3.1: The hierarchical of the German DRG 
  
In 2008 the G-DRG system consists of 1.137 DRGs and 115 additional charges 
(Zusatzentgelte). Important changes (codes, procedures, grouper algorithm, 
extreme cost DRGs, DRG for multiple procedures, quantity of DRGs, additional 
charges) were made by InEK every year and decided by the self-government in 
the health service. For the 2008 system, the InEK has begun with a moderate 
modification of the CCL matrix. 
The DRG catalogue lists all DRGs with and without national uniform cost 
weights, and co-payments for certain complex or cost-intensive services, and/or 
for very expensive drugs. DRGs without national uniform cost weights are the 
result of insufficient data (may be due to the small sample size) for calculating 
the costs. Hospitals need to negotiate their individual prices for those 
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unweighted DRGs with the sickness funds. There are other surcharges in the 
reimbursement component that meant for new and innovative diagnostic and 
treatment procedures (example Neue Untersuchungs und Behandlungs-
methode, NUB). The process for funding is through individual negotiation 
between a hospital and the sickness funds.  
When calculating cost per case, all DRG-related costs are fully considered in 
order to obtain an optimal DRG costs weights. Outlier cases are excluded at 
this stage in order to have a medically coherent and cost homogenous group of 
DRGs. The average cost of inlier cases are determined for each DRG. The 
inliers cases are referred to cases that are treated within the standard LOS 
demarcated by a low and high LOS trim point.  
Outlier cases are defined by crossing the lower or upper trim points of the 
standard LOS; respectively they refer to the short-stay and long-stay outliers. 
The minimum lower LOS trim point is two days or one third of the mean value of 
LOS, whilst the upper-LOS trim point is equal to the sum of the mean LOS and 
two standard deviations from the mean or calculated as the sum of the mean 
LOS and the preselected maximum value that is selected such way that the 
surcharges for long-stay outliers equal approximately 5-6% of the total amount 
to be reimbursed via DRGs [52]. The short-stay outliers (SSO) are subjected for 
per diem reduction, whereby the long-stay outliers (LSO) are reimbursed by per 
diem surcharges. The former case involves only cost differential of the 
respective DRGs (after deduction of non-primary costs from total costs of 
inliers) that further equally distributed among all treatment days below the 
lower-LOS trim point. Hence, an average cost per day is determined for 
respective DRG. Further dividing these average cost per day by the respective 
allocation base will finally generate a per diem cost weight, which is later used 
as a basis for deduction in the DRG catalogue. In contrast, surcharges for the 
latter cases (LSO) are calculated in three different ways, depending on the 
condition of the cost outlier distributions and other factors.  
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In the process of quantifying the hospital’s average revenue per case, it 
involves the calculation of case mix index (CMI) or so-called average case 
weight of individual hospital, which is calculated by dividing the case mix (CM) 
by the total number of cases. This measurement reflectes the average 
utilization of health care resources of an individual hospital. From 2003 to 2009 
(convergence phase) the hospital base rate is calculated by dividing a hospital’s 
historically derived budget by the case mix. This calculation reflected the 
hospital’s specific average DRG cost. Even though the hospital base rate 
among hospitals in Germany varies, somehow it gradually pushing to the 
principle goal of equalizing the rate to a state-wide base rate in 2009– same 
price for comparable hospital services throughout one state (Bundesland), 
independently of level of care, hospital structure or other factors.    
 
3.1.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System 
Setting certain criterion on the selected factors is an attempt by InEK to improve 
the G-DRG mapping and consequently reduce the cost differences for 
establishing homogeneity within DRGs. A few elements have been considered 
for RA within the G-DRG system. As earlier mentioned in Section 4.1.2, case-
based fixed-sum remuneration relates to treatment carried out within the 
framework of standard LOS. The LOS is calculated as the sum of the mean 
LOS and twice the standard deviation or maximum difference. The fixed 
maximum difference is chosen that the day-based revenue supplement for day-
outliers beyond the LOS is accounted. 
The DRGs differentiation is also taken into account the complexity changes in 
various alternatives and it is stimulated by using a standard set of splits for 
identified algorithms, such as PCCL (patient clinical complexity level), age, 
duration of ventilation used, mode of discharge and admission weight for 
neonate. 
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The G-DRG system uses the CCL (clinical complexity level) matrix or complex 
diagnosis (example osteomyelitis) to estimate the utilization of resources for the 
treatment of complications within the system. The PCCL is defined as “a 
measure of the cumulative effect of a patient's CCs”. The complication and 
comorbidity level (CCL) and patient clinical complexity level (PCCL) assigned 
within G-DRG assignment are valued respectively, for every diagnosis and 
separation, to measure the cumulative effect of complications and 
comorbidities. The PCCL split criteria into four levels of CCs, 1 to 4 presented 
the increasing state of patient’s severity. Changes for 2007 to 2008 involve a 
total of 19 new diagnoses included inside the CCL matrix by InEK. 
Changes done by InEK could either be deletion or addition of the split criterion 
of procedures. The functions will have new grouping relevance, which could 
bring improvement to its function to become a more flexible split criterion.  
“Complex treatments” modification was done, particularly on the use of the 
international therapeutic intervention scoring system (TISS) and the simplified 
acute physiology score II (SAPPS II) respectively, as grouping criteria in 
intensive care medicine. Significant clinical and laboratory chemical parameters 
of the patients, and specific chronic illnesses that make intensive care 
significantly more difficult an expensive such as malignant tumor as well as 
HIV/AIDS are covered by the above mentioned ICU scoring systems. However, 
HIV/AIDS is already classified under separate category in the MDC 18A HIV. 
Patient’s age and the admission status are amongst considerable risk adjusters, 
whereby these criteria are splitted into a few groups. Patients on intensive care 
units are scored daily. The sum of all scored points during the hospitalization is 
used for DRG allocation. High scores mark very complicated patients. However, 
the use of mechanical ventilation or artificial respiration is the primary criterion 
for ICU specific DRG allocation. The ventilation time is splitted into three 
breakdown parameters: minimum is >24 and maximum is >1799 hours. These 
classes are unique for the German DRG-variant.  
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In the case of a newborn infant with serious problems (DRG P02) in 
cardiothoracic or vascular interventions is replaced by a split based on length of 
artificial respiration. There were age splits introduced for determining pediatric 
treatments. Procedures such as radiotherapy, chemotherapy or radiotherapy 
are splitted based on the procedure list, for multiple interventions, criterion is 
split "in multiple locations" has been introduced. 
Pertaining cases of newborn infant, admission weight has become the criterion 
element in the G-DRG system. The weight is differentiated on the basis of 
admission weight <999 grams prior to further splitted by admission weight <600 
grams (P61A), 600–749 grams (P61C), 750–874 grams (P62A) and 875–999 
grams (P62C). 
 
3.2 The Dutch Diagnosis Behandeling Combinaties (DBC) 
The Dutch health care system is a highly centralized system and was 
traditionally regulated by the central government. The specific health care 
providers are: GPs (for primary care), hospitals (for secondary and tertiary care) 
and nursing homes (for people who need nursing care, medical care or 
rehabilitation that cannot be offered at home). Major changes were done in 
2006, when the system became more market-oriented and demand driven. The 
central government is shifting responsibilities towards the health care providers 
and health insurance organizations; more self-regulation based on market 
principles, which management is by two-tiered public-private system. This new 
system is a private health insurance with social conditions. The insurers are 
obliged to accept every resident in their area of activity. And the presence of 
risk equalization enables the acceptance obligation and prevents direct or 
indirect risk selection. The Health Insurance Act provides for an income-related 
contribution to be paid by the insured. Employers contribute by making a 
compulsory payment towards the income related insurance contribution of their 
employees. There are three compartments of the health insurance system 
available for three different coverages; the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act 
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(Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten, AWBZ) for long-term care and high-
cost services coverage, Sickness Fund Act (Ziekenfondswet, ZFW) for acute 
care coverage for public or privately insured patients, and the third compartment 
is a complementary insurance policy that may be bought to extend coverage. 
People who disqualify for compulsory health insurance due to certain reasons 
and are as well unacceptable to private health insurance (high risk patient) may 
enroll into Medical Insurance Access Act (Wet op de toegang tot 
ziektekostenverzekeringen, WTZ). 
The Diagnosis Treatment Combinations - Diagnosis Behandeling Combinaties 
(DBC) system is nationally implemented, initiated by the interest of the Dutch 
government to develop a tool which gave essentially insight in the complete 
care pathway for each hospital patient. DBC is used for the registration, hospital 
reimbursement and medical specialist care. The main objectives of introducing 
DBC were to increase transparency of hospital and specialist care, to realize 
the transmission from a supply-led to a demand-led system and to introduce a 
hospital reimbursement system that would increase efficiency and facilitate 
regulated competition between health care providers. There are two reasons for 
developing an own-DBC system; firstly the existing DRG-based system was 
insufficient and did not result in the transparency required, and secondly, the 
Dutch wanted to construct a system that covered both inpatient and outpatient 
hospital care [26]. An additional reason was the desire to bring the incentives of 
medical specialists and hospitals into alignment, reduce income differences 
between similar specialties, and create transparency in the relationship between 
output and costs [10]. 
The foundation of "DBC-onderhoud" is an initiative of all major health care 
players in the Netherlands: the hospitals, the insurers, the physicians, the 
patient organizations, and the main function of this foundation is supplying 
users and user groups of the DBC-system with (online) help. A scientific 
advisory board has to support the operation of DBC-onderhoud. 
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DBCs include inpatient and outpatient care of medical specialists, which means 
that general practitioners (GPs), dental care and paramedical care are not 
covered by the DBC system. Rehabilitative care provided in hospitals is covered 
by the DBC case mix reimbursement system. Laboratory and imaging services 
performed as part of inpatient or outpatient specialist treatment are covered by 
the DBC reimbursement system. DBCs are based on (medical) process 
description instead of patient classification (which is the case with DRGs). The 
DBC relies on an episode-based registration within hospital. This implies that 
the codification process starts at the beginning of the care process and ends 
after the treatment completion. The maximum duration of a DBC is one year, 
and a new DBC is opened if the treatment proceeds more than one year. 
Hence, the type of care will be chronic periodical check up. That means a 
patient can meet more than one DBC in a treatment episode. Since its 
implementation in 2005, till now, all hospitals and medical specialists in the 
Netherlands demonstrated their acceptance towards this new hospital and 
medical specialist reimbursement system by registering to use the system. 
 
3.2.1 Use in the Health Care System 
The case mix system based on DBCs was introduced in the Netherlands in 
February 2005. The DBCs (characterized by combining ICD-10 diagnosis code 
and treatment) is a DRG-like pricing system used in the Netherlands describing 
all products that are provided in hospitals. A DBC defines the whole of the 
hospital and medical specialist activities and services arising from the demand 
for care by a patient consulting a specialist in a hospital. In this definition, 
“activities” refer to both medical and medical support services, such as 
outpatient visits, days of treatment, and number of days in daycare of the 
hospital and medical specialist. It constitutes the clinical pathway of the demand 
for the care of a patient, and represents the activities and services in the 
hospital associated with this demand. It covers the pathway from an initial 
consultation or examination all the way to the final check-up. To determine the 
price of a DBC, the use of the hospital's resources are linked to the activities of 
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services in the care process. These activities are nationally described 
beforehand, based on one particular diagnostic and therapeutic strategy that 
should be followed to achieve a DBC. If there are new medical developments, 
these guidelines will be updated by a DBC maintenance organization. 
The Dutch system has 29,000 DBCs. To ease the billing process, these 29,000 
DBCs are classified into 600 cost homogeneous product groups.The medical 
experts were involved in the determination of these DBCs, which are defined as 
the whole set of activities (diagnostic and therapeutic interventions) of the 
hospital and medical specialist starting from the first consultation and diagnosis 
of the medical specialist in the hospital until discharge. Unlike DRGs, a DBC is 
not based on the diagnosis of discharge, but relies on an episode-based 
registration within hospitals. As a consequence, the codification process starts 
at the beginning of the care process with the first visit of a patient to a medical 
specialist. During treatment the use of all hospital services is being registered. 
The codification process stops when the care process has finished.  
One of the unique characteristics of the Dutch system is that it is possible to 
change the DBC registration during the treatment process. This occurs when a 
physician changes his opinion regarding the best treatment for the patient. In 
the Dutch system physicians have to register the DBCs, whereas in other 
countries, such as the US and Australia, this task has been delegated to official 
coders. 
Episode of care is defined through three specified dimensions; type of care, 
diagnosis and treatment axis. The type of care is related to the type and phase 
of the treatment (for example regular care, emergency care or chronic periodical 
check up). The diagnosis coded according to the Dutch ICD-10 classification 
version and critical pathways, whereas the treatment axis expresses the setting 
and nature of the treatment, for example ‘chemotherapy with clinical episode’ or 
‘expectative/follow up in outpatient treatment’. Dutch episode-based registration 
of hospital products is illustrated in Figure 3.2 below. One patient can have 
multiple DBCs and only the recent DBCs can be reimbursed. Each DBC is 
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characterized by a code combining information on diagnosis (based on the 
Dutch version of ICD-10) and treatment, and integrated in the DBC Grouper 
software to blend for the right DBCs.  
 
Medical 
Specialist 
Outpatient, day-
care  
Radiology/OR/Labora-
tories/Nursing days 
Clinical pathway 
Hotel 
services 
Technical 
services 
IT 
Board of Director 
Accounting 
DBC 
Figure 3.2: Episode-based registration of hospital products, DBCs with related    
intermediate products Source: Elkerliek Hospital Helmond, 
 
3.2.2 The System itself 
The DBC pricing system is uniformly implemented at the national level. The 
Health care Tariff Board/Health care Authority (CTG/ZAio) is a governmental 
organization responsible on issuing the tariff and determine the budget for 
health care organization and providers in the Netherlands. About 10% of the 
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hospitals’ revenues result from DBCs with variable prices. The prices are 
negotiated between hospitals and medical insurance companies. The price of 
the remaining 90% of the DBCs is fixed and determined by the health care tariff 
board. The percentage of DBCs with negotiated prices is expected to increase 
steadily over the next few years. In the Dutch case mix system for-profit 
ownership is only allowed for some types of elective care. 
There are two different DBCs pricing lists: List A for DBCs with fixed prices and 
List B for DBCs with negotiable prices, which both cover the honorarium of 
medical specialists and the hospital costs, including wages, medication, medical 
materials, overheads, housing and equipment but not the capital costs for the 
List A. The prices are annually updated by the National Office of Statistics 
based on weighted-price of wages and goods, with an assumption that two third 
of the hospital costs constitute costs of personnel, one third constitutes non-
personnel costs. The services comprised in this list are within the hospital 
allowable budget. The hospitals, with these fixed tariffs from List A, oblige to 
charge both health insurer and patient. In contrast, List B comprises services 
that are not within the hospital allowable budget, such as treating major 
diagnoses like hip and knee arthrosis, diabetes mellitus, cataract and inguinal 
hernia. This budget is calculated, taking into account several structural 
parameters: the hospital's adherent population, the type of facilities present, the 
number of beds and the production parameters such as the number of bed days 
and outpatients visits. DBCs in the price List B vary based on negotiation done 
between hospital and health insurer. The capital cost is included in List B. 
For each DBC on List A, the tariff for the hospital cost component is calculated 
as the average use of a health care service times the median unit cost of a 
service, summed over all health care services. The calculation of the 
honorarium component is based on time studies. For each DBC, the 'normal 
time' of specialist involvement has been determined and validated. For DBCs on 
list B, the relationship between prices and cost is function of the negotiation 
power of insurers and providers. DBCs prices are less biased by outliers due to 
the calculation made on the DBCs. List A was based on median not the mean. 
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The calculation for unit costs of hospital services involves the product costing 
model that was initially derived from 23 front-runner hospital dataset 
information. The model has become a standard model to calculate unit cost 
DBCs, and the model is simultaneously capable of differentiating between 
health care services (intermediate products produced from final cost centers) 
and DBCs (final products). Costs involved in the support cost centers 
(departments not providing patient care such as administration, billing etc) will 
be assigned to the final cost centers through a weighting methodology based on 
various allocation base. The determination of the unit DBCs cost in each 
hospital involves two parts of calculation: firstly, calculating the unit costs of 
intermediate products by dividing total costs per centre by the number of 
services produced for cost centers that produce only a single product. Those 
centers which produce multiple services will make use of the weighting statistics 
calculating the cost of services. In a second step the intermediate unit costs 
products are multiplied with the resource used profile. The outcome is then 
multiplied with the median unit costs of the intermediate products across all 
hospitals. The calculation summary of the product costing model is illustrated in 
Figure 3.3 below. 
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Costs of 
support cost Costs of final cost centers 
Unit costs of intermediate products 
Unit costs of DBCs 
Allocation base 
Use of intermediate 
products per patient per 
DBC 
Figure 3.3: Product costing model to calculate the intermediate product costs 
and DBCs 
 
In the current situation, reimbursement of List A DBC only serves as a vehicle to 
transfer money (the hospital's allowable budget) from health insurers to 
hospitals and medical specialists. The level of production is negotiated with 
insurers, and the result is an input into the calculation of the hospital budget. If 
the entire yield of DBC reimbursement exceeds or remains below the allowable 
budget, differences are compensated by a 'closing tariff' in the next year. The 
maximum production and the price of each DBC on list B result from 
negotiations between hospitals and health insurers. As a result, prices may also 
vary with the size of production and, for instance, parties may agree upon a 
lower or higher DBC price if production exceeds a predetermined figure. 
With the DBC financing system, the Netherlands have set an ambition to 
improve the system and data collection and to further develop a structural 
incorporation of costs for building, education and outpatient medication in DBC-
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logic. Implementation in mental health and extending DBCs to primary care are 
amongst the ambitions for the future.  
 
3.2.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System 
Unlike DRG systems, risk adjustment within the DBC system involves 
continuous adjustment on indexation of tariffs and fees and some improvements 
in rates and/or fees in some specialties and/or products (as DBCs is defined as 
a set of activities provided). As earlier mentioned a uniform product-costing 
model is being used for calculating unit costs DBCs. Patient’s in-hospital stay 
was largely determined by the procedure they received in the whole spectrum of 
inpatient care. The approach used and the algorithm considered in the cost 
accounting is linked to activity-based elements within the hospital. The product 
at the final costs center is elaborated explicitly in the case of multiple 
intermediate products, where the weighting statistic is used to assign the costs 
of the final costs centre to the various services.  
Adjustment was done at the specialization level. For instance, at Ophthalmology 
department (Table 3.1), where adjustment was done by differentiating the 
cataract patients (DBCs 554) with the same diagnosis and treatment by the 
patients’ insurance coverage (insured or uninsured patients) for DBC to DBC 
and a single DBC or outpatient DBC. To make advantage to this adjustment, 
the patient data set will be assigned with relevant performance code 
(functioning in reduce the Clinical without Days -). This will make each patient 
bill presenting a unique DBC of its own. Performance code can trace the same 
characteristics wherever the patients seek treatment.   
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Specialize 
AGB code 
Type 
code 
Care 
code 
Diagnosis 
code 
Derivative 
treatment 
DBC declaration 
code insured care 
Performance 
code 
0301 21 - 554 31 151452 210005540031 
0301 21 - 554 32 151453 210005540032 
0301 21 - 554 33 151454 210005540033 
Table 3.1: Example of the parameters used in Ophthalmology department for 
adjustment activity 
 
Recently, there are four new codes for expensive medicines retroactively added 
in both of the DBC-health tables. The drugs are Alemtuzumab (190526), 
Palifermin (190527), Rituximab (e.g. for rheumatoid arthritis) (190528) and 
Infliximab (for ulcerative colitis) (190529). Other new products such as short-life 
blood products are as well introduced, whereby the hospitals must record the 
cost of blood and blood products to be allocated. The aim is to keep track the 
delivery and cost of short - sustainable blood products by DBC. This has 
resulted in sixteen codes which have been added to the new tariff table.  
The cross-compensation on the dialysis DBCs are adjusted by monthly to 
weekly compensation based on DBCs tariff table. Whereas, for the psychiatry 
consultation, the declaration rate is adjusted based on the specified declaration 
code list. 
Intramural care is classified in care-weighted packages (zorgzwaartepakketten). 
These packages are based on client profiles, a global description of the care in 
terms of functions, the total amount of care in hours and a description of the 
setting (place where the care is delivered, example 24 hour monitoring) and the 
conditions under which the care is delivered (according appointment at 
scheduled times or unplanned). 
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3.3 The Swedish use of the Nord-DRGs 
The Swedish health care system is currently comfortable with a decentralized, 
public system involving national, regional and local government at the political 
and administrative levels to provide and evaluate health care. The central 
government is responsible in maintaining a legislative supervisory role, while 
the councils and municipalities are responsible for the financing and provision of 
health services. There are 87 hospitals which are public (owned and financed 
by the counties), 3 hospitals which are private and for profit and only a small 
minority of private and non-profit hospitals.  
The funding structure of the Swedish health care sector is mainly based on 
taxes (local grant and county income taxes) and co-payments (2.5%). In 2004 
(latest update is not available) Sweden spent about 9.1% of its GDP on health 
care, the largest share of which comes from taxes. It was slightly above the 
average for nations that belong to the OECD. Sweden experienced a slow 
growth in health expenditure, from 8.2% of the GDP in 1990 to 8.7% in 2001, 
and remains 9.2% from year 2002 to 2005 [57]. 
The NordDRG system is currently used as their health care financing modality, 
implemented at three levels of administrations; national, regional and local. 
There has been a movement of applying the DRG system, from the use of 
DRGs to “reimburse performance” to “describe performance”. This system is 
based on primary classified medical data and on the previously defined 
algorithm that group single care events into larger groups, which are consistent 
from both economic and medical perspectives. Most counties use the NordDRG 
system for management purposes and as a reimbursement system, where the 
usage as the latter tool varies across county councils as not all county councils 
are using the said-DRG system. Moreover, Sweden does not promote national 
compulsory use of this system as other Scandinavian countries do. The 
application was initiated by a few reasons; the long waiting-lists and the lack of 
incentives for providers to increase health care output owing to fixed budgets [4, 
3].  
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3.3.1 Use in the Health Care System 
The contract model (purchaser-provider concept) is relatively popular among 
counties in Sweden for reimbursements to hospitals within their own county 
while others, using case mix based payment systems for between counties 
reimbursements. The Swedish-NordDRGs have only been used for somatic 
care, including both acute and planned care but excluding psychiatric inpatient 
care, burn injuries and rehabilitation. In some counties specific regional care, 
some unusual and expensive drugs or materials might also be excluded and 
separately reimbursed. The exclusion list varies among counties. The use of the 
Ambulatory Payment Classification (APC) has been tested in Sweden. 
Stockholm County has an own-developed system called KÖKS system, used 
for the grouping and reimbursement of outpatient visits. The grouping 
methodology is focused more on cost homogeneity than clinical relevance. 
Similar systems have been introduced in other counties. It is in the plans for the 
national case mix office (Centrum for PatientKlassificering, CPK) to start a 
project for the development of a national case mix system for outpatient care. 
Latest developments in Sweden also include the development of case mix 
systems for description and funding of the psychiatric sector and the primary 
health care sector [48].  
 
3.3.2 The System itself 
The Nordic version of DRG (NordDRG) system has been adopted in Sweden 
since 1990’s, initially introduced by the Swedish Planning and Rationalizing 
Institute (SPRI) of health as a payment system for acute inpatient care by some 
county councils, and further improved and maintained by the Swedish 
Association of Local Authorities and Regions. This system derives from the 
logic of the HCFA-DRG version 12 and it is created with openly accessible 
grouping definitions, based on ICD-10 and Nomesco Classification of Surgical 
Procedures (NCSP). Minor adjustment had been done on NordDRG version 
1996 to establish the Swedish-NordDRG version 2002 that involved changes on 
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the neonatal groups. The hierarchical level of Swedish-NordDRG is illustrated in 
Figure 3.4 below. The first version of outpatient procedure based on NordDRG 
was developed and completed in 2002.  Approximately, 70% of all cases are 
originally grouped from NordDRG listed for the nationwide Hospital Discharge 
Registration System. The major responsibility of maintaining and developing the 
NordDRG process is taken by the CPK. 
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Figure 3.4: Swedish-NordDRG assignment process 
 
In the light of its implementation, the combination between NordDRG system 
and the case-costing data is applied in order to have a payment system that is 
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consistent from both, medical and economical perspectives. The setting of 
case-costing (bottom-up costing approach) in Sweden is initiated by the 
Federation of Sweden County Councils that is compiling case costing data from 
20 hospitals in Sweden to the national case-costing database for the calculation 
of the Swedish national DRG weights. Information about the activity, such as 
surgery, laboratory test, intensive care and nursing care are included inside the 
case-costing data. Uniquely, the national DRG-weights are based on individual 
patient related costs, which are calculated by distributing all costs in the case-
costing to the individual case in patient specific services and mixed together 
with the patient characteristics.  
Hospital information data was collectively stored inside the data warehouse 
(integration model), where all data is connected.  The weight generated from 
the case-costing model involves four consequent steps; identifying the accurate 
total cost of the hospital, allocating indirect costs to the absorbing cost centre, 
identifying intermediate products and calculating their costs and finally, 
distributing products and costs to the patients. The weight for each DRG is 
calculated by dividing the average cost for each DRG with a cost that 
represents DRG weight 1.0 (equivalent to average DRG cost). It is basically up 
to every county council to decide their own calculation method. Commonly, the 
last year’s average real cost for DRG-weights is used.  
Case-costing contributed advantages to the Swedish health care system, where 
its application is broadly involved in the management support services for clinics 
and hospitals, the support to buyer of health care, important as benchmarking in 
cost studies and medical praxis, and is certainly greatly important for health 
care price calculation in the DRG system. Currently, case-costing for psychiatry, 
outpatient care and primary care are progressively done.  
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3.3.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System 
Adjustment on the national version of Swedish-NordDRG are made chiefly to 
adjust for the national variations of ICD-10 and NCSP with the aim of eventually 
harmonising the different versions.  
In the Swedish national DRG-weights, costs for outliers are excluded from the 
Swedish-NordDRG reimbursement system list and the payment is separately 
done. The outlier limits are based on individual patient costs and also based on 
LOS as a service to those hospitals that yet having the case costing (or 
individual patient related costs). The rules for outliers apply only to the high end 
of the distribution. On the other hand, the low end is excluded as the cost of 
those cases is too low to be considered.  
There are a few rules for identifying high-costs DRGs related to patient’s LOS 
treated in tertiary hospitals with specialized units. Patients with coronary 
infarction who die within the first 3 days of the hospital stay, patients with burns 
remitted to other hospital within first 5 days of the hospital stay, and short 
therapy patient with a contact less than 2 hospital days (if the patient does not 
die) are subjected to a special DRG based on modified HCFA DRG.  
The rules for neonatology in NordDRG are more complex. A patient who either 
died or was remitted to other hospitals will be assigned to “DRG 385A Neonate, 
died within 2 days or transferred to other unit within 5 days”. However, this is not 
the case if either the patient who died during the hospital stay was treated in 
that hospital longer than one day and one night (during more than 2 calendar 
days) or the patient who was remitted to an other hospital and was treated more 
than 5 days in that hospital or if neonatal intensive care procedures were 
performed for that patient. 
In the coding process (applying ICD-10 codes), two codes marked with an 
asterisk (*) and a dagger (+) are used, which respectively indicate the 
symptoms or manifestations of a disease and the etiology of the disease are 
needed to define one diagnosis. Each diagnosis may only belong to one 
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complication categories (COMPL), where the category of each patient case is 
determined by the secondary diagnosis. Complication categories may appear in 
two forms; active and inactive CC-categories. The difference between those two 
CCs is the former CC-property of the patient will turn positive, unless the 
principal diagnosis is on the exclusion list for that CC-category. Whilst, 
activation is needed by the latter category by other diagnosis property of 
another diagnosis to turn active. Without activation, the inactive CC-category 
does not affect the DRG assignment in any way. In the condition where the CC-
categories may possibly be given the same diagnosis two times, the exclusion 
lists for each CC-category comprise those diagnoses that belong to the same 
‘family’ available to avoid complication in determining the right diagnosis. 
Age is always calculated as days at admission by applying six different age 
limits: patient with principal diagnosis only applicable to children cannot be older 
than 17 years (6,574 days) of age, patient with principal diagnosis only 
applicable to adults can not be younger than 14 years (5,114 days) of age, 
obstetric patients may not be older than 56 years (20,440 days) of age or 
younger than 11 years (4,018 days) of age, neonatal patients have several age 
limits while the standard neonatal patient may not be more than 1 year old (365 
days) at admission, patients may not be more than 125 years (45,654 days) of 
age, and for children (except neonatal DRG’s) the patient may not be older than 
18 years (6,574 days) of age. 
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3.4 The French Groupes homogènes de maladies (GHM) 
Frances employs a system of a statutory health insurance (l’assurance 
maladie), contributions to which are mainly paid by the employers (2006: 12.8% 
of gross income). Employees only pay 0.75% of their income to the statutory 
health insurance. On the other hand, relatively high co-payments are required 
when services are utilized [47]. 
The expenses of the statutory health insurance (l’assurance maladie) in France 
amounted to 135 Billion Euros in 2005, 61.1 Billion Euros of which were spent 
on hospitals [14]. The costs for research and teaching as well as investment 
funds are supplied by the statutory health insurance as well. The government 
contributes less than 40% to the costs for investments. 
Approximately 65% of the hospitals in France are public hospitals. 20% are 
privately owned while 15% belong to other institutions. Hospitals provide apart 
from in-house surgical, medical, obstetric and psychiatric treatments also 
certain ambulatory care and rehabilitation. Public and non-profit hospitals 
always worked on a global budget and are not financed on a per-case payment, 
while private hospitals used to work on a fee for service basis.  
 
3.4.1 Use in the Health Care System 
Since 2004 the financing of hospitals undergoes major changes in France. In a 
period of convergence historical budgets, which were not derived from the 
output of a hospital, are transferred to budgets that result from the output 
measured by the GHM. This process ought to be accomplished in 2012 and 
comprises the private hospitals as well. The GHM are supposed to contribute to 
a more equitable regional distribution of budgets. Momentarily regional 
supplements that compensate for historic differences still exist. Not comprised 
by the GHM are psychiatric cases, rehabilitation, most of the ambulatory care, 
dialysis at home and parts of the transplantation medicine and emergency 
treatments. Furthermore per diem rates for treatment on intensive care units are 
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financed separately from the GHM-system. On the other hand ambulatory 
chemotherapies, radiotherapy, coronary angiographies and some of the 
ambulatory surgery are part of the GHM-system. For rehabilitative care a 
separate Classification (SSR - Soins de suite et de réadaptation) was 
developed, the development of a Classification for psychiatric treatment is in 
progress. Expensive and innovative drugs or implants (example. pacemakers, 
heart defibrillators, cardiac valves, brain stimulators, etc.) are financed by 
additional payments and therefore are not covered by the GHM.  
 
3.4.2 The System itself 
The GHM derive from the third version of the HCFA-DRG from 1985 and have 
been supplemented 1997 by elements of the AP-DRG Version 10 of the GHM 
consists of 782 different groups (not containing error groups). There are 27 
different Major Diagnostic Categories (CMD). The GHM system distinguishes 
between surgical and medical partitions. Adjacent DRG are not used. 
Exceptional is the CMD 24 that lists 154 groups for ambulatory care/surgery 
(LOS less than 2 days).  
When the hospital stay exceeds an upper trim point a daily surcharge is allowed 
for. When the LOS falls short of the lower trim point (and patients have not 
deceased) only 50% of the lump sum is accounted for.  
The Agence de traitement de l'information hospitalière is responsible for 
calculating and maintaining the national cost weights. The weighting of the 
GHM in the cost calculation relies on a trimmed mean. In contrast to other DRG 
systems the trim point for the cost calculation are not defined by LOS but by 
costs. The calculation is based on the hospital cost data set provided by the 52 
reliable and quality participating hospitals. 
Different from all other DRG systems is the way the principal diagnosis is 
determined within the GHM system. The principal diagnosis should be the one 
that required most of the resources (approximate to the WHO definition). As the 
French dataset consists of different datasets for each department in which the 
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patient was treated, the principal diagnosis for the GHM grouping is determined 
by an algorithm that aims to choose the correct principal diagnosis 
corresponding to the above mentioned principle. In this algorithm surgical 
procedures, length of stay and department of discharge are used. Asterisk 
codes for manifestations are used as principal diagnoses instead of the 
aetiology codes listed in the ICD-10.  
 
3.4.3 Determination of Risk Factors within the System 
As in most DRG systems additional diagnoses are used to identify high cost 
patients. The GHM are not a refined DRG system though. Similar but not 
identical to the AP-DRG system diagnoses for the GHM are differentiated in 
relevant and severe complications and comorbidities (CMA - Complications et 
morbidités associés, CMAS - Complications et morbidités associés sévères) 
and defined on the level of the Major Diagnostic Categories (CMD). There is a 
list of CMAS for traumatic and non traumatic complications and comorbidities 
respectively. 
Cases with severe complications and comorbidities (CMAS) are collected in not 
specific accumulated GHM on the level of the Major Diagnostic Categories 
(CMD). For cases with relevant complications and comorbidities (CMA) specific 
GHM are possible, sometimes combined with age criteria.  
Parallel to the introduction of the CMA and CMAS lists, exclusion lists were 
established.  They refer to the principal diagnosis, so if a diagnosis is listed in 
the specific exclusion list for a principal diagnosis it cannot count as CMA or 
CMAS. The exclusion lists were deliberately defined according to medical and 
not statistical reasoning. So are for example symptoms of the principal 
diagnosis or related diagnoses not considered as CMA or CMAS. Important in 
this context is the different definition of the principal diagnosis in the French 
GHM system. 
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The other major risk adjusters in the GHM system are splits defined by age 
(28/120 days, 2/18/70/81 years). There are both GHM defined solely on and 
both on age and CMA. 
GHM for Neonates are similar to other DRG systems differentiates by 
admission weight. 
As most other DRG systems the GHM provide specific CMD and groups for 
cases with HIV, transplantation medicine and polytrauma. 
As the treatment on intensive care units is accounted for by per diem rates 
outside of the GHM system a special consideration of hours of mechanical 
ventilation or special scoring systems is not regarded as necessary within the 
GHM system. However to benefit from the additional per diem rates special 
requirements must be fulfilled. Apart from structural qualifications one of 40 
different diagnoses must be coded together with a minimum of points in the 
IGS-II score (translation of the SAPS II). 
Severity indicators for the ambulatory GHM (CM 24) are not used, however the 
mode of discharge (death, transferral into another hospital) will lead to a 
grouping into two special GHM. 
In special circumstances cases can be assigned to more than one GHM 
simultaneously. This is possible for dialyses, radiotherapy, the hyperbaric 
oxygen therapy and specific implants and represents a form of additional 
payment.  
When multiple services that are related to different CMD are provided from a 
single department the case will be assigned to an error group. 
Like in all one-dimensional DRG systems the representation of complex and 
multiple treatments poses a problem. Therefore France is testing a system in 
which a case can be regularly assigned to more than one GHM. This system, 
which is called Effeuillage Progressif (EfP), does not use the classic risk 
adjusters (CMA or CMAS, age) anymore but a complex system of primary GHM 
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(GHM élémentaires) and additional or secondary GHM. Each GHM obtains 
apart from the normal cost weight a sensibility coefficient and a complexity 
coefficient. The first is used when the GHM is primary GHM, the latter when the 
GHM is secondary. A case is then weighted by the cost weight of the primary 
GHM and the complexity coefficient of the secondary GHM which is/are again 
weighted by the specific sensibility coefficient of the primary GHM. Cost weights 
would not be calculated anymore as means but determined by multivariate 
statistical analysis. First analyses show a reduction of variance by 10% and a 
reduction of necessary GHM down to 370. 
The summary of results is tabulated in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 for the countries’ 
health care system and prospective payment system in use, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results 
Country 
Grouping 
system in-
use 
Structure of the health care system Objective of DRG employment 
Germany 
G-DRG 
(introduced 
in 2003 
adapted from 
AR-DRG, v  
4.1) 
 
The healthcare system preliminary determined by national rules and legislations. 
Dual funding system is practiced. The financing system is via compulsory social 
insurance contribution and/or additional private insurance.  Taxes are meant for 
investment for hospitals 
 
 
Principally used more towards pricing 
system. The system is nationally 
implemented and geographically 
decentralized. All inpatients and some day 
cases included in the DRG coverage, 
while psychiatric care, ambulatory care 
and rehabilitation are excluded. 
 
Sweden 
Swedish-
DRG 
 (based on 
Nord-DRG) 
 
A decentralized public system for financing, providing and evaluating healthcare 
activities. Central government which has a legislative supervisory role. County 
councils are responsible for financing and providing almost all health services. Local 
municipalities have same responsibilities as the counties but only for elderly care and
disabled 
 
The financing is effected mainly by local and counties' income taxes and patients co 
payments (2.5%) 
 
 
The 
Netherlands 
Diagnosis 
Behandeling 
Combinaties 
(DBC) 
 
 
The Dutch health care system is more market oriented. The Dutch government plays 
a major role in planning and regulating the health care sector. The central 
government is shifting responsibilities towards the health care providers and health 
insurance organisations; more self-regulation based on market principles. 
 
 
The main objectives of introducing DBC 
were to increase transparency of hospital 
and specialist care, to realize the 
transmission from a supply-led to a 
demand-led system and to introduce a 
hospital reimbursement system that would 
increase efficiency and facilitate regulated 
competition between health care 
providers. 
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Grouping 
Country Structure of the health care system Objective of DRG employment system in-
use 
France 
GHM (based 
on HCFA-
DRG) 
 
The French system is a national system with some regional 
Customization, where the role of the national level is to define the rules and the 
regional role is to conduct planning and to sign "goals contracts" but recently since 
the beginning of French DRGs the role of the national government has increased. As 
a result, the calculation of hospital budgets is made at the national level. 
 
The financing is based on compulsory social security for all citizens 
 
 
 
Aim to improve efficiency and harmonize 
prices and payment methods between the 
public and private sectors. 
 
Table 3.2:  The summary of the health care systems, prospective payment systems and the objectives of employment in 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden and France 
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Grouping 
system 
The taxonomy of DRG Cost accouting Risk factors 
G-DRG 
 
Main grouping criteria based on diagnosis, procedures, age, 
co morbidity, cause of discharge. 
A total of 23 MDCs, involves 1137 DRGs and severity levels 
expansion from 4 to 9 levels in version 2008. 
Coding definition is by ICD-10-GM and OPS-301 procedure 
classification  
Differences in their financing rate is presented. Hospital-
specific DRG revenue per cases exclusively presented from 
each hospital 
Financing outliers within DRG system are based on LOS that 
is applied to the low and high end of the distribution. 
 
DRG cost weights, DRG price and 
determination of risk factor are based on 
hospital cost and claim data set from 214 
participating hospitals.  
The calculation of the DRG weight works in full 
cost accounting (average related cost) instead 
of service weights. 
DRG weights are based on costs. And the cost 
weights are uniformed at national level 
 
 
PCCL, principal and additional 
diagnoses, complex procedures, 
procedure functions, age, hours 
of mechanical ventilation, multiple 
procedures on different dates, 
length of stay, same day case, 
admission weight and mode of 
admission or discharge 
 
Swedish-
DRG 
 
 
Applied for acute care and planned care and excludes non-
somatic care. The exclusion list varies among counties. 
Sweden has no national DRG policy 
Outliers only applied to the high end of distribution of 
individual patient costs and LOS. For the low end only cases 
with too low costs are excluded. 
 
DRG prices calculated according to the case-
costing of 20 specific hospitals.  The average 
last year’s real cost. Is adjusted by the 
budgeted differences for expected cost or 
estimated increase in productivity next year. 
DRG weights are based on costs. 
 
 
LOS, PCCL, age 
 
Diagnosis 
Behandeling 
Combinaties 
(DBC) 
The DBC system is nationally implemented, it is used for 
acute care hospitals including inpatient and outpatient care 
of medical specialist. As well as rehabilitative care, 
laboratory and imaging services for specialist treatment. The 
system offers a framework of product definition and cost 
allocation. 
Prices of DBCs of List A are calculated on the basis of a 
median instead of mean. Consequently, the prices are less 
The DBC case-mix system involved the 
adoption of a uniform product costing model to 
calculate unit costs of DBCs.  
Pricing and quality system are uniformly 
implemented at the national level. 
DRG weights are based on full cost 
methodology, which involves 23 hospital 
costing data sets. 
The activity-based elements 
within the hospital are adjusted, 
where the product at the final 
costs centre is elaborated 
explicitly in the case of multiple 
intermediate products. 
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Grouping 
system 
The taxonomy of DRG Cost accouting Risk factors 
biased by outliers. 
GHM 
 
The French GHM system is nationally and uniformly applied 
for all kinds of hospitals providing acute care (public, non-
profit and for profit). Ambulatory chemotherapies, 
radiotherapy, coronary angiographies und some of the 
ambulatory surgery are part of the GHM-system. 
Not covered under GHM are psychiatric cases, rehabilitation, 
most of the ambulatory care, dialysis at home and parts of 
the transplantation medicine and emergency treatments.  
Per diem rates for treatment on intensive care units are 
financed separately from the GHM-system.  
Use of a similar system for not-for-profit and for profit 
hospital with a convergence of tariffs between the sectors. 
Tariff/ price for GHMs are based on hospital activity level on 
the previous year, and it is adjusted with geographical 
correction factors. 
 
DRG weights are based on costs. 
The tariffs or prices and cost weights are 
based on the same scale, which costing data 
set obtained from 52 participating hospitals. 
 
 
 
CMA and CMAS, age, admission 
weight for neonate, usage of 
mechanical ventilation, separate 
category for HIV, transplantation 
medicine and polytrauma, mode 
of discharge, multiple services, 
and complex and multiple 
treatments 
 
 
 
Table 3.3:  The summary of the DRG system taxonomy, the cost calculation and the risk factors employed in Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden and France
Discussion 
4 Discussion 
4.1 National Differences in Determination of Risk Factors 
The results indicate that the main objectives of implementing DRG systems are 
profoundly determined by each country. The strategy of achieving the objectives 
for fair hospital reimbursement and creating homogeneity within the DRG 
pricing system are straight forward. Observing into each country’s Manual DRG 
Classification Guideline, intense risk adjustment on the selected DRG 
parameters or product elements have been done primarily to generally ensure 
that the costs variance within the DRGs is consequently reduced.  
Adjustment has been applied in various ways that involve various risk factors. 
Each proxy country demonstrated different numbers and types of risk factors 
adjusted. However, they show similarity of choosing patient’s severity, age and 
length of hospital stay to be adjusted. The Netherlands, exceptionally are 
making use of the activity-based element to adjust for the high-DBC price, and 
actually had included those three algorithms mentioned above in their product 
costing, which is unfortunately, implicitly presented in the DBC manual. Due to 
this difference, DBC will be separately discussed. 
Although Germany and France are considering more risk factors to be adjusted 
for high-costs DRGs within their systems as compared to Sweden, however, 
there are two algorithms they have in common; PCCL and patient’s age are risk 
factors highlighted in this study (Figure 4.1).  
64 
Discussion 
 
G-DRG 
Additional diagnosis, complex procedures, procedure functions, 
multiple procedures on different dates, 
same day case  
 GHM 
Hours of mechanical ventilation, admission 
weight and mode of admission/discharge) 
separate category for HIV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transplantation medicine and polytrauma, 
multiple services, and complex and 
multiple treatments 
DBC 
Activity-based products
SWEDISH-NordDRG 
LOS               CC, age 
Figure 4.1: Venn diagram simplifying the similarities and differences of risk 
factors applied in each country 
 
Severity of illness is associated with higher costs. PCCL in certain 
circumstances can be related to a treatment on an ICU in the German, Swedish 
or French system. ICU treatment again is associated with the usage of 
mechanical ventilation or artificial respirators. However, the usage of ventilator 
apparently is not considered within Swedish-NordDRG. Instead, the G-DRG 
and GHM systems are considering the usage hour of the ventilation as those 
that need to be adjusted for high-cost DRGs.  
Notwithstanding, upon having quite a number of risk factors, G-DRG and GHM 
systems have determined other risk factors that are considerably unique for 
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their own as demonstrated in Figure 4.1. This reflects the nature of the patients 
treated within the inpatient care facilities in each respective country.  
There are various ways of manipulating the risk factors to encounter the 
problem of DRGs cost variance. As we can see, all proxy countries (with 
exception of the Netherlands) split the case type into two or more parts 
according to clinical attributes such as diagnoses or method of treatment, and 
then setting different payment rates for each. Splitting by the need for intensive 
care is an indicator that has been widely reported. It is indicated that there are 
many DRGs that contain patients with demand for intensive care and leave 
others, who do not need the service in a large variation in actual costs of care. 
The rationale is, however, if the DRG was split into two parts, calculatively the 
variations within classes would be greatly reduced. Separate payment rates 
practically, could then be set for each part. In the case of DRG classification, it 
is a normal part of periodic updating to explore whether splits involving the 
variables already used to define DRG boundaries will improve the homogeneity 
of selected DRGs.  
The Dutch DBC system cannot be comparatively discussed with DRG-Systems 
in full because the system is ultimately unique at its own. The DBC payment 
system is a DRG-like system but different in many ways. Fixed tariff is issued 
for DBCs so that the hospital cost component, taken into account the median 
unit cost of the service. Subsequently, in the DBC system less outliers occur in 
the costing system, However, DBC continuously committed to risk adjust their 
product list costing by accomplishing necessary changes to rules and regulation 
of the intermediate product at various departments particularly at specialty 
department for DBC cost balancing.  
In addition to the unique criteria of Dutch DBC, the system has another option of 
screening the high outliers. It involves the use of care pathways, where part of 
the process involves recording whether a patient remained on the pathway, or 
whether there was a significant deviation. If a deviation (or variance) occurred, it 
is good clinical practice to record it for later review. A subset of reasons why the 
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patient deviated can be selected as the basis for making additional payments. 
These are equivalent to high outlier payments. 
The variation of risk factors highlighted in this study are probably due to several 
fundamental aspects of DRG costing for the respective DRG system. 
Differences in the definition of data samples, differences in the choice of 
methodology applied to determine the outlier cases (and subsequently high 
outlier cases) and differences in the methods for calculating individual cost 
weights or reimbursement rates or prices are amongst fundamental reasons for 
the risk factor variations to be discussed. 
In regard to the first reason, the numbers of hospitals from which cost data are 
collected and pooled are different among countries. For example, SPRI Sweden 
initially collected costing data from only 20 hospitals as a basis for national 
case-costing model calculation much less as compared to the number of 
participating hospitals received by InEK (214 hospitals) to calculate the cost 
weights for the G-DRGs. The Dutch calculated the average DBCs costs and set 
tariff for DBCs on List A based on information from 23 front-runner hospitals 
(together with unit costs of intermediate products) and France collected 52 
hospital data sets for the same reason (Table 3.3). Usually the distribution of 
hospital costs is highly skewed, and the selection of outliers is sensitive both to 
the criteria used and to the underlying distribution. These calculations could be 
improved if many more hospitals participate by contributing their hospital 
costing and claim data for the national calculation purposes. These criteria 
usually seek to balance the need to ensure high-quality data standards with 
obtaining a representative sample of hospitals.  
Pertaining to the second reason, the outlier’s determination process usually 
involves a standardized mathematical trimming method to eliminate the 
frequently occurring deviations of extreme resources used. This process usually 
involves several trimming methods that yield different results [37, 36, 41, 42]. 
For this purpose, parametric or non-parametric trimming methods are applied 
by these countries to define threshold values (trim-points). Germany and France 
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applied parametric method with plausibility checking in their trimming process 
resulting in a robust mean value. While Sweden has applied a non-parametric 
approach to determine the trim point, the Netherlands do not correct the outliers 
because they do not calculate the DRG cost weights [26]. The main difference 
between these two approaches is that the variance within the DRG on the trim 
point is significantly higher for parametric method [9]. As a consequence, the 
cut of point for high outlier would be rather high for the high-cost cases. 
Therefore the choice of method must depend on the characteristics of the data 
sample as well as on the goals that health care policy makers intend to achieve 
by using DRG systems. 
The final fundamental reasoning to explain the risk factor variations is the 
differences in calculating the cost weights or reimbursement rates or DRG 
prices. Different approaches are currently applied to determine DRG prices. In 
Germany and Sweden for instance, DRG cost weights calculation is applied to 
set for DRG prices, whereby the risk adjustment in both countries is regionally 
differentiated. Whereas France directly determines the prices based on the prior 
setting of prices for each DRG (calculation based on the average costs per 
DRG) and risk adjustment of DRG prices differentiated at different levels of care 
[8]. The Dutch are defining their reimbursement rates based on the price of the 
medical procedures performed. Clearly, differences of reimbursement 
mechanisms and reimbursement rate definitions could contribute to the risk 
factor variation in this study. Figure 4.2 illustrates the defining reimbursement 
rates and types of reimbursement systems for the selected countries.  
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DRG system Catalogue of 
procedure 
Regional 
differences Level of care 
Calculated or 
negotiated price 
per procedure 
Set or 
negotiated price 
per cost weight 
Average 
cost per 
DRG 
Germany 
Sweden 
France Netherlands 
Reimbursement 
system 
DRG prices 
adjustment  
Reimbursement 
rates definition 
Use/calculation of 
DRG cost weights
Calculation 
of prices
Figure 4.2: Different types of reimbursement systems and defining 
reimbursement rates employed in Germany, Sweden, France 
and the Netherlands 
 
Additional factors that relate to the cost weights are, that there are countries 
that apply the DRG system uniformly (example Germany), while others apply 
different sets of cost weights (example Sweden), depending on the 
administrative unit responsible for the provision of hospital care. There is also a 
variation related to hospital ownership, implying that cost weights may depend 
on the financing structure of the health care system as a whole.  
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4.2 Dependence of Risk Factors Determination on the Structure of 
National Health Care System 
As shown in the chapters above different nations with different Health Care 
Systems use different risk factors within their DRG systems. The crucial 
question is whether and to which extend the structure of the national health care 
system influences the selection and development of risk factors for DRG 
systems.   
DRGs have not always been used solely for financial reasons. This is 
demonstrated in some countries that use DRGs as instruments of management, 
benchmarking or health statistics. The effects of the implementation of DRG 
systems give a good picture of their diversity. Countries that decided to 
implement more recently DRGs favor mainly for financial use. The fundamental 
challenge for most hospitals under DRG reimbursement is the economic 
survival. In most health care markets exists strong competition. Thus, a process 
of engineering (improvement of operational and organizational structure) is 
absolutely necessary. 
 
4.2.1 German health care system and risk factor determination 
In Germany, the involvement of the government is limited to the management of 
infrastructure and legal regulations. The InEK supports the contracting parties 
(hospital organizations and the insurance companies) with the introduction and 
continuous development of the G-DRG system. The InEK is responsible for the 
calculation of the cost weights and the annual adaptation of the G-DRG system. 
The cost weights per DRG are calculated from the average costs per case in 
the contributing sample of hospitals, and it is uniform at national level. The price 
per DRG results from the multiplication of its cost weight with the base rate at 
the federal state level. Furthermore, negotiations held between hospitals and 
insurance companies are important for cases that are not part of the DRG 
budget.  
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There has been no scientific evaluation of the impact of G-DRG system 
implementation within this dual financing health care structure yet. The sole 
costs for developing the system were acceptable. Apart from encountering the 
hospital economic risk due to the high-costs cases, risk factor determination 
done by InEK seems to support the ambition to improve the G-DRG system with 
increasing precision by reproducing the real relation of costs of hospital services 
within the yearly analysis of case-related cost data. Parallel the intention to 
have more transparency and a fairer remuneration in hospital financing and the 
incentives for a more economical delivery and efficiency in the utilization of 
resources has been backed. 
 
4.2.2 Swedish health care and risk factor determination 
In Sweden, the three levels of independent government; the national 
government, the county councils and the municipalities are all involved in health 
care with the goal to equalize 95% of the income differences and 100% the 
differences in need [4]. Although decision-making is highly decentralized to local 
governments, overall goals and policies are determined at the national level. 
Existing variations in the supply and costs of health services across local 
governments are all linked to different priorities. Local government raises most 
of its revenue by levying proportional income taxes on the population, but about 
20% of local government funding is supplemented by central government 
grants. While CPK is responsible to produce national prospective weights for 
NordDRG (inpatient and outpatients), the county councils in some cases, 
setting own payment levels for services under DRG assignment. It is due to the 
loose implementation (not mandatory) of using the national weight sets and 
flexibility for the local authorites to use their own local weights in the counties. 
As a consequence, a variation exists in the methodology used for calculating 
the DRG cost weight in this country. Even the DRG price lists for each hospital 
in and between counties are different due to different technical and ideological 
reasonings. Therefore, the scenario above reflectes the monopolistic model of 
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health care system, which decisions in regard to manipulating the identified risk 
factors are based on the county level on local issues. Hence, the system of 
Swedish-NordDRG financing is endurable for the hospital sector and the health 
care authorities 
Although the objective of employing the NordDRG system (to increase 
productivity, transparency in hospitals activities, the creation of a common 
"language" between professionals and administrators, a financing system that 
focus on hospitals activities instead of organization, a description of 
performance in a better way and the realization of a tool for benchmarking) is 
claimed being realized, however, there are still various needs to be resolved. It 
is commonly suggested that there should be dealt with cost outliers and to get 
new groups when new drugs or devices or new technology come in-use.  
 
4.2.3 French health care and risk factor determination 
Like other countries, France is comfortable with the Assurance Maladie, the 
scheme that reimburses health costs for medical consultation, medical 
examinations and treatment in doctors’ surgeries and in hospitals. The national 
tariff applied within the GHM system is differentiated by the way the tariff is 
calculated for profit and non-profit hospitals. GHM are applied at acute care 
hospitals, and used for inpatients and day cases for medicine, surgery and 
obstetric specialties: The national cost weights calculated by the Agence de 
traitement de l'information hospitalière actually comprise high-cost cases that 
were initially attached behind the backdrop of principle diagnosis. Risk 
adjustment was established within the system to encounter the costs variation 
attributed by these high-cost cases, whilst parallel to the centralized national 
health care focus to improve efficiency and harmonize prices and payment 
methods between the public and private sectors.  
GHM have certainly increased transparency in hospital activities and the system 
has been accepted by the hospitals, although some difficulties had to be 
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overcome. However, the most quoted suggestions in France in respect to the 
useful changes for GHM-financing arise from the ethic and deontological 
problem, care accessibility for patients and the choice of patients by hospital 
and certainly private hospital or clinics. 
 
4.2.4 Dutch health care and risk factor determination 
In the Dutch DBC reimbursement scenario, the system’s complexity is justified 
by their high transition costs. Maintenance, registration and validation of DBCs 
are complex and the associated costs are deemed too high. Moreover, the 
functioning of the DBC system is highly dependend on the cooperation of 
hospitals and medical specialties [26]. This system facilitates negotiations 
between health insurers and hospitals on prices (on a bilateral level). Risk 
adjustment on the identified high-cost products instead of to reduce the costs 
variation, is also meant for the product costs negotiation for a fair price. 
Reviewing the hospital reimbursement in the Netherlands, the hospital budget is 
determined by the allowable costs (the national fixed DBC-rate from List A), 
whereby the tariff is issued by the CTG/ZAio and approved by the Minister of 
Health. Obviously, there is no connection between prices and unit cost 
presented.  
It is at a too juvenile stage to be assessed, whether the objective of its 
employment is or will be realized. As yet, doubtful arguments arise towards the 
awareness for the output, quality and efficiency of hospital and medical care 
based on the limited national data of resources-use-profiles as a basis of the 
national case-costing.  
 
4.3 The Future Determination of Risk Factors in DRG Systems 
The primary purpose DRGs have got to offer is an accurate cost assessment of 
treating a given patient in the light of observable and measurable patient 
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characteristics. In this role, the main challenge is to determine the potential 
high-costs cases in order to ensure the risk adjustment process is unbiased and 
accurate. Technically, DRGs should be based on both economically and 
clinically meaningful groups. That requires careful decisions on the design of 
the DRG system, such as the hierarchy and algorithms used to classify patients 
into a limited number of groups. Economically, patients within one group should 
have homogeneous costs. Clinically, cases allocated to one group should form 
a distinguishable entity based on main diagnosis, severity, co-morbidity and/or 
treatment performed.  
Otherwise DRG-based payment systems would pose unwanted incentives in 
the care strategies for high-cost cases. The DRG system itself is unable to 
reduce the total costs of inpatient care because the effect of DRGs will be only 
the redistribution of resources. For hospitals which do not control the terms of 
the reimbursement ratio to costs, consequences could be dramatic. The 
discussion covered in this study may not be fully comparable as the countries 
use different DRG systems with different diagnoses and clinical procedure 
groupings. Apparently, there are large variations in the number of groups across 
the different systems in use. 
The variation of risk factors identified in each proxy country may be technically 
due to several differences in the DRG cost accounting methodology. As in all 
countries which have adapted this form of financing, it would be necessary to 
have data from a sufficient sample of hospitals to base funding on an 
acceptable empirical foundation. Therefore, the hospitals within a complete 
system of per case charges based on DRGs, should have an own interest in 
limiting its costs. Calculation of cost weights is crucial in the reporting of hospital 
care outputs and the method used to calculate individual cost weights that 
varies between countries is one among other factors that contributes to the 
variations of the hospital reimbursement rate. And hence, a factor that lead to a 
different selection of risk factors within DRG systems of those countries.  
74 
Discussion 
The influence of the national health care structure towards the determination of 
risk factors within the proxy countries is profoundly explained by which country 
with a social health insurance system will generally encourage the competitions 
between public and private hospitals by applying the same reimbursement 
system to all providers, for instance, Germany, France and the Netherlands. 
Whereas, countries with primarily tax-financed system, use a DRG system to 
set reimbursement rates between different regions as part of a regionalized 
system as presented in Sweden.  
It is a fact that no international DRG system has so far been developed that 
would permit international comparisons. A move to develop an international 
DRG system is required for ongoing measurement activities in the hospital 
sector. An international system would also be able to confront differences in the 
applications of DRGs which limit comparability such as the treatment of outliers 
and the calculation of cost weights. Thus, international comparisons of hospitals 
require developing a common weighting set. Such a set could be built on the 
basis of a cross-country sample of hospitals which have high-quality patient 
level data and cost accounting. In this regard, a standardized methodology of 
collecting health expenditure data becomes of paramount importance.  
The European DRG systems are rather substantial, the systems have diverged 
and followed different paths over the past two decades. Hence, the systems 
reflect different preferences in medical practice and new technologies. As a 
consequence, harmonizing European DRG systems and sharing the same risk 
factors for high-costs cases within the DRG systems do not seem to be realistic 
in the short or medium terms. However, in the long term some kind of European 
DRG system may be created for a cross-border movement within the EU. If 
case mix policy is to maintain credibility, the funding arrangement must respond 
to changes in the cost structure of hospitals and meet increases in demand [18, 
41, 42]. This study could serve as fundamental information for future activity of 
outcome research of DRG variation. 
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